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THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL 
AND RISK OF U.S. MULTINATIONAL 
AND U.S. DOMESTIC FIRMS (1965-1978)
Mehmet Ya^ar Geyikdagi 
SUMMARY
This study tests the hypothesis that the cost of 
equity capital and hence the total risk of U.S. Multi­
national firms would decrease in relation to that of 
U.S. domestic firms because of the maturing (sophisti­
cation) of both the host countries and the multination­
al corporations as well as the improvement of communi­
cations.
It has been found that between 1965 and 1978, the 
host countries, recipients of foreign direct investment, 
have adopted a more mature and sophisticated attitude 
vis-à-vis the multinational firms. They have specified 
the type of foreign direct investment they sought more 
clearly and made appropriate rules more specific and 
clear. Likewise, the multinational firms have become 
more mature, experienced and sophisticated in their 
relationships with host countries. Moreover,
communications have shown major improvements during the 
same period.
The results of the tests are,in general, supportive 
of the above hypothesis. The cost of equity capital 
and the earnings-price for the overall averages of 
U.S. multinational firms have decreased in relation to 
that of U.S. domestic firms during 1965-1978. This
means that the total risk of the multinational firms 
decreased in relation to that of the domestic firms. 
Systematic risk, as measured by beta values, has been 
roughly the same for both during 1971-1973. After 
that, the beta average of the domestic firms decreased 
in relation to that of the multinationals because of 
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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this study is to compare the cost of 
equity capital and total risk of U.S. multinational firms 
with that of U.S. domestic firms during the 1965-1978 
period and then to analyze and evaluate the research find­
ings in terms of their application to business and invest­
ment decision-making.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
It will be shown that the host countries are adop­
ting a more mature and sophisticated attitude vis-à-vis 
the multinationals and vice-versa and that communications 
and transportation have vastly improved. It is hypothe­
sized that these factors will tend to reduce the risk of 
U.S. multinational firms as perceived by U.S. stockholders 
in comparison to that of U.S. domestic firms. Hence, an 
empirical test will be carried out to see whether this 
really is the case or not.
A survey of the literature shows that virtually no 
research at all has been made in this area. The only 
empirical studies which compare the costs of equity capi­
tal of multinational and domestic firms are those of 
Theodor Kohers (1971 and 1975) and of Aggarwal (1979)-
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According to Geyikdagi (I98O), such studies offer no 
possibilities of establishing trends, let alone finding 
the factors behind these trends. The dearth of empirical 
studies on multinationals certainly does not help compa­
nies and other investors who would like to make sound in­
vestment decisions. This becomes even more important when 
the direct investments of U.S. multinational corporations 
have attained so large a magnitude. Hence, this study 
should prove of importance to U.S. investors as well as 
to host countries. Accordingly, the following brief back­
ground information is relevant at this point.
Today, there is virtual unanimity that U.S. multi­
national corporations play a very important part in the 
U.S. as well as in the world economy. According to Kohers 
(1971:2), the foreign operations of U.S. companies are 
essential in transmitting knowledge, technology, admini­
stration, and resources not only to other countries, but 
also by way of feedback to the United States. By combin­
ing their own techniques with those available in the host 
countries, the multinationals attain a new synthesis and 
the process may repeat itself.
The U.S. foreign private direct investments have 
reached a very high level. They were estimated at $70 
billion in I969 and according to Kozlow, Rutter and Walker 
(1978:16), in 1977 they reached $148.8 billion. During 
the 1960's, plant and equipment expenditures of U.S. sub­
sidiaries abroad have grown twice as fast as those for
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domestic affiliates. During the same period, the annual 
return of earnings from these foreign investments exceed­
ed the yearly direct investment outflows-for the past ten 
years (Kohers, 1971*3)• Sales by majority-owned foreign 
affiliates of U.S. companies increased from $108.5 bil­
lion in 1967 to $514 .7 billion in 1976 (Chung, 1978*32). 
Even though these figures are not adjusted for constant 
dollars, the growth is still very considerable.
The purpose of this study, as stated before, is to 
compare the total risk of U.S. multinational firms with 
that of U.S. domestic firms during the 1965-1978 period. 
The reason for starting the analysis in I965 is that there 
was not a sufficient number of multinational firms before 
that year (Kohers, 1971*65-66). The reason for taking 
the multinational corporations of the U.S. rather than 
some other country is that the U.S. is not only by far 
the largest foreign direct investor in the world, but is 
also the only country to have a large enough sample of 
large domestic firms and large multinational firms which 
could be compared. The sample has been selected from 
"The Fortune Top 500 Firms" listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange. The author of this study attempted to carry 
out the same type of analysis with companies of the 
United Kingdom, second in the world as far as foreign 
private direct investment goes, but could not get a sig­
nificant sample at all. Firms which have 30 percent (35 
percent after 1974) or more of their operations abroad
—  4 —
are defined as multinationals whereas firms with 10 per­
cent (15 percent after 1974) or less of foreign operations 
are domestics. Although these cut-off rates have an ele­
ment of arbitrariness, widening the difference between 
them would have greatly reduced the number of firms in 
the sample. On the other hand, narrowing the difference 
would have cast serious doubts as to whether two different 
types of firms, multinationals and domestics are really 
being compared. More explanations about the implications 
of these cut-off rates will be given in Chapter 3*
To measure risk, we shall use earnings-price ratios, 
the cost of equity capital (The Gordon dividend valuation 
model) and the betas of the capital asset pricing model. 
Subsequently we shall explain in greater detail the rea­
soning and implications behind the selection of these cri­
teria. We shall see how the average risks of the sample 
of 28 multinational firms we take compare year by year 
with their domestic counterparts, which also total 28 
firms, during the 1965-1978 period. Other things being 
equal, the higher the earning-price ratios or the costs 
of equity capital, the higher will the total risk be.
The betas, on the other hand, will measure systematic 
risk, which is only a part of total company risk. Nat­
urally, a lower total risk for a firm, will mean lower 
costs of equity and debt capital and hence a lower weight­
ed average cost of capital. This is important both for 
the investor and the corporate manager as well as for the
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host country which wants foreign private investment on 
the most suitable financial terms. All of them would 
find it useful to know what the risk trends look like 
in the 1965-197# period and what major factors lie behind 
these trends.
LIMITATIONS
A sample of 28 U.S. multinational firms and 28 U.S. 
domestic firms is substantial. Yet, a larger sample 
would, of course, have been better. The same could be 
said for the number of years encompassed by the study. 
Instead of the 14 years that we have, a longer period 
would certainly have been preferable. However, as we 
shall explain in Chapter 3» dealing with the methodology, 
we found that a larger sample or a longer period were im­
possibilities .
Another point is that the formulae and models used 
in our study are based on certain assumptions like con­
stant growth rates for firms or perfect markets. It is 
quite unlikely that these assumptions are fully valid in 
the real world. However, since our study is basically 
one of comparing two samples, namely the multinationals 
and the domestics, any method of computation which tends 
to slant the values in one sample is likely to do the same 
for the other sample. Moreover, because of the substan­
tial number of firms in each sample, the law of large 
numbers should work to our advantage.
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NATURE AND ORDER OF PRESENTATION 
In this research, we shall begin by explaining the 
evolution and importance of multinational business to 
the world and the United States. Then, we shall describe 
the methodology used in the study. Afterwards, we shall 
deal with the maturing of the multinational firms and the 
host countries together with a short discussion of the 
improvement in communications which tends to facilitate 
multinational business. An empirical (statistical) test 
will be carried out and its results will be interpreted 
and analyzed. Making use of the results, we shall analyse 
each industry group separately and then compare forward- 
looking and historical growth rates used in calculating 
the cost of equity capital. We shall also look at the 
theories of international business and how they relate to 
our findings. Finally, of course, a conclusion will be 
stated. In the Appendix, major economic events during 
the 1965-1978 period are reviewed.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EVOLUTION OF MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS*
ITS SIGNIFICANCE AND MEANING
Companies which operate in more than one country 
do not constitute a novelty. If one goes back to the 
various India companies, the most prominent of which was 
the British East India Company, or the merchant bankers 
of London or the Rothschilds, who, being established in 
five different European countries, made transfers to one 
another and owned mining interests in countries where they 
were not represented; Spanish mercury mines were one ex­
ample. Towards the end of the nineteenth century or at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. United States 
companies like International Harvester, Singer, Standard 
Oil and Ford established themselves and produced in sev­
eral countries abroad, just as British, Swiss and Dutch 
companies did. There is the problem of defining these 
firms either as international or as multinational, the 
latter gaining widespread usage only in the I96OS (Leon, 
1977:499).
Several definitions have been proposed. According 
to one definition, any firm, which has more than 25 per­
cent of its sales abroad, is considered a multinational. 
Until the Second World War, it could not be conceived 
that a firm could make more than 5 or 10 percent of its 
sales abroad. In 1970, more than one hundred United
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State Companies had more than 25 percent of their sales 
abroad. Another definition makes use of a firm's per­
centage of investments that are abroad. Other defini­
tions or criteria could be being listed on more than one 
financial market or the percentage of employees outside 
the home country or, still, the percentage of total in­
vestments that is overseas (Leon, 1977:499-500). The 
criterion of sales seems to be by far the most widespread 
one in the literature.
Besides the above criteria, a multinational firm has 
a management that is differentiated because of its opera­
tions on several markets. The subsidiary abroad is not 
regarded as a poor relative but as an equal which has a 
lot of autonomy and has to be reckoned with. This dis­
tinguishes it from the traditional international firm 
where the subsidiary has little to say in the central 
board. In contrast with international firms, multi­
national corporations use foreigners even at the highest 
levels of the company. For example, the president of IBM 
is Jacques Maisonrouge, a Frenchman. Actually, the multi­
national corporation is still a new phenomenon which does 
not conform to a unique model or organization (Leon, 1977: 
502). It is still in the trial and error or, perhaps, 
soul searching stage. That, in a sense, may be helpful 
since it would leave the multinational firm ample room 
for manoeuvre and adaptation when it faces changing cir­
cumstances in the world. In other words, it is still
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malleable enough to adapt to new conditions and to mature 
as we shall see later.
The United Nations uses the term transnational 
rather than multinational on the grounds that the former 
is more descriptive of the concept of a parent firm based 
in one country with operating affiliates in a number of 
foreign countries. The term multinational would then de­
note a company owned by several nationalities, whether or 
not it had affiliates in other countries. Actually, the 
preference for transnational is not merely technical but 
rests on the belief that the term more accurately reflects 
the quality of domination inherent in the parent-subsidi­
ary relationship in contrast with the implication of co­
equality in multinational. Notwithstanding these dis­
tinctions, the word multinational will encompass both 
multinationals and transnationals in this study.
Major factors which lead United States companies to 
set up or increase manufacturing facilities abroad in­
clude the following (Fatemi, de Saint-Phalle and Keefe, 
1963:163 and U.S. Department of Commerce, 1972:14)*
1. Tariffs, import quotas, and currency controls 
which, of course, limit exports.
2. Lower transportation costs on goods produced lo­
cally in the host countries.
3* Saturated markets in the United States.
4. Expectation of higher profits in economies with 
a growth rate higher than that of the U.S.
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5‘ Patent laws which, in certain countries, require 
firms to manufacture locally in order to obtain patent 
protection.
6. Foreign consumer preference for simpler and 
cheaper versions of certain goods produced and sold in 
the United States.
7 . Lower corporation income taxes and more generous 
depreciation allowances in certain countries; in some 
cases, tax holidays and other financial inducements.
8. International versus domestic diversification.
9. Antitrust laws in the United States.
In the late fifties, the Eisenhower Administration 
thought that the main forces which led. U.S. corporations 
to invest abroad were stability, security and the quest 
for profit. Protection of the actual or potential market 
against Western Europe or Japan was another factor. Great 
efforts were made to create a suitable investment climate 
in the world and to convince investors of good returns on 
investment with a reasonable payback period. Many cor­
porations with international orientations made use of this 
opportunity to develop their operations abroad (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1972*14).
Multinational business, mainly resulting from foreign 
direct investment, has become more important than foreign 
trade as the main agent of international economic rela­
tions in terms of size, rate of growth, and future poten­
tial.
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Following World War 11, Western Europe, and 
many nations in Latin America, Asia and 
Africa welcomed investments from abroad of 
almost any kind. The multinational corpora­
tion broke through the walls of the nation 
state. The International Monetary Fund, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development and the United 
Nations Conference for Trade and Develop­
ment have all advocated the liberalization 
of capital ... Over the last two decades the 
concurrent growth of the multinational cor­
porations and rise of nationalism in many 
countries have brought to the fore conflicting 
schools of thought that rest on varying assump­
tions and conclusions as to what determines 
the massive growth of international investment 
and what course it is likely to follow (Fatemi 
et al., 1976*14 and 41).
For example, while one person may argue that the 
total risk for multinational firms has been continually 
rising during the last decade, another individual may 
claim just the opposite. This arises mainly because of 
the dearth of empirical studies on multinational busi­
ness and related topics.
In 1977» the book value of United States direct in­
vestments rose to $148.7 billion. This figure excludes 
long-term investments in stocks and bonds. Another im­
portant aspect of the multinational firm is that since 
1968, net foreign investment income has been much greater 
than net receipts from the trade account. In I96O, there 
was a $4 .9  billion net balance on the trade account and a 
$0 .5 billion net balance on the direct foreign investment 
account. In 1970, the export surplus from trade fell to
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a level of $2.1 billion which is less than the $3-5 bil­
lion net income from investments abroad (Fatemi et al., 
1976: 48). This difference grew even further as for­
eign investment income increased while the foreign trade 
surplus turned into a deficit. A look at the table below 
shows the increase in book value of United States direct 
private investment as well as its distribution throughout 
the world in i960, I965, 1973 and 1977*
It can be seen from the table that the United States 
private direct investments abroad have shown the largest 
growth in V/estem Europe. The billion dollar figures for 
i960, 1965 » 1973 and 1977 are respectively 6.7» 14.0,
37*2 and 6O.6 . The share of Western Europe in the world 
has continuously risen. It was 21.0 percent in I96O,
28.0 percent in 1965» 34.7 percent in 1973 and 40.7 per­
cent in 1977. Canada's share has fallen from 35*0 per­
cent in i960 to 2 3 . 8 percent in 1977* Latin America shows 
a decline from 26.0 percent in i960 to I7 . 2 percent in 
1973. Then it rises slightly to 18.6 percent in 1977* 
Although Canada's share declined, it still continues to 
be by far the largest single recipient country of United 
States investment. The fact that Japan's share has re­
mained quite low is due to the restrictions imposed by 
Japan rather than a lack of interest by United States 
corporations. These restrictions emanate from a worry of 
American control of Japanese business as well as the very 
different employment practices of the United States as
- 13 -
TABLE 2-1 Location of U.S private direct investment
in the world (in billions of dollars)
1960 1965 1973 1977
Western Europe 6.7 14.0 37.2 60.6
percent 21.0 28.0 34.7 40.7
Canada 11.2 15.3 28.1 35.4
percent 35.0 31.0 26.2 23.8
Latin America 8.3 10.9 18.5 27.7
percent 26.0 22.0 17.2 18.6
Japan 0.3 0.7 2.7 4. 1
percent 1.0 1.0 2.5 2.8
Other 5.4 8.6 20.8 20.9
percent 17.0 18.0 19.4 14. 1
Total 31.9 49.5 107.3 148.7
percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Freidlin and Lupo (1972:21 -34), :Lupo
(1973:21- 34) , Scholl (1974 : 1 —6 ) and Kozlow,
Rutter and Walker (1978: 16-38). The author
has converted dollar figures into percentages 
so as to facilitate comparisons.
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compared with Japan (Fatemi et al., 1976*49-50).
Figures for the I97I and 1977 American direct invest­
ment by industry groups are shown in Table 2-2.
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TABLE 2-2 U.S. private direct investment by industry 
groups






Other industries 26.4 52.3
percent 30.6 35.1
Source; Lupo ( 1973:26-27) and Kozlow et al 
(1978:16-38).
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It can be seen from the table that while the share 
of oil has declined between I97I and 197 > the shares 
of both manufacturing and particularly other industries 
have gained prominence during the same period.
Sales by majority-owned foreign affiliates of U.S. 
companies by industry and by geographical area for I967- 
1976 are as shown in Table 2-3» below (Kozlow et al.,
1978:32).
- 1? -
Table 2-3 Sales by majority owned foreign affiliates of U.S. companies, 
1967-1976 (billions of dollars).
Billion of dollars
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Total 108.5 120.8 134.3 155.9 184.4
By industry
Mining and smelting 3.5 3.9 4.2 4.5 3.9
Petroleum 31.1 34.0 36.4 42.4 53.1
Manufacturing 52.6 59.6 67.6 78.3 90.9
Food products 6.1 6.2 6.8 7.5 9.1
Paper and allied products 2.0 2.6 3.0 3.4 4.2
Chemicals and allied products 8.5 9.8 11.0 12.6 15.0
Rubber products 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.7
Primary and fabricated metals 4.6 5.3 6.0 7.6 6.7
Machinery, except electrical 7.6 8.6 10.2 12.3 14.3
Electrical machinery 4.6 5.1 5.9 7.7 9.1
Transportation equipment 12.1 14.2 16.1 16.8 20.4
Other 5.4 5.9 6.4 8.0 9.4
Trade 14.5 16.2 18.3 21.6 25.4
Other industries 6.9 7.0 7.7 9.0 11.1
By area
Total developed (percent) 73% 72% 74% 74% 75%
Developed countries 79.2 88.0 98.5 116.2 136.3
Canada 26.8 29.8 32.3 35.1 40.3
Europe 44.2 49.1 55.8 68.4 81.2
European communities (9)^ 37.5 41.2 46.6 57.6 68.4
France 5.5 6.5 7.4 8.3 10.5
Germany 8.1 8.8 10.6 14.6 17.1
United Kingdom 14.7 15.1 16.2 18.5 21.6
Other 9.2 10.7 12.4 16.2 19.1
Other Europe 6.7 7.9 9.2 10.9 12.8
Japan 2.5 2.9 3.4 4.2 5.1
Australia, New Zealand, and
South Africa 5.6 6.2 7.0 8.5 9.7
Total developing (percent) 27% 28% 26% 26% 26%
Developing countries 25.9 29.2 32.2 35.1 41.8
Latin America 15.8 17.4 18.8 20.1 21.4
Other Africa 2.3 2.8 3.2 3.6 4.1
Middle East 4.2 4.7 5.3 5.8 8.9
Other Asia and Pacific 3.7 4.3 4.9 5.7 7.5
International and unallocated 3.4 3.6 3.6 4.6 6.3
The European Communities (9) was established in 1973. Estimates for 
earlier years are the sum of estimates for the European Communities 
(6), Denamrk, Ireland, and the United Kingdom.
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Table 2-3 Sales by majority owned foreign affiliates of U.S. companies, 
1967-1976 (billions of dollars).
(cont.) Billion of dollars
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Total 211.9 291.4 437.7 463.1 1 514.7
By industry
Mining and smelting 3.2 4.0 5.1 4.6 5.5
Petroleum 58.8 90.8 184.9 183.5 205.5
Manufacturing 107.6 140.9 175.7 192.3 212.8
Food products 10.4 13.7 17.0 18.3 20.4
Paper and allied products 5.2 7.0 9.3 9.2 10.1
Chemicals and allied products 17.8 25.5 36.2 37.6 43.1
Rubber products 3.2 3.9 5.0 5.4 5.7
Primary and fabricated metals 7.6 9.5 12.5 12.6 14.4
Machinery, except electrical 17.0 22.2 27.4 32.1 34.2
Electrical machinery 10.8 13.9 17.4 18.8 18.4
Transportation equipment 24.4 30.3 32.7 38.1 44.8
Other 11.2 14.9 18.2 20.2 21.7
Trade 30.1 38.9 46.1 52.2 58.0
Other industries 12.2 16.9 25.9 30.6 33.0
By area
Total developed (percent) 75% 71% 62% 65% 66%
Developed countries 158.2 207.8 272.2 302.8 337.3
Canada 45.0 56.5 71.4 78.5 89.0
Europe 95.9 127.3 165.8 186.5 206.7
European communities (9)^ 80.7 107.0 138.5 155.8 171.5
F rance 13.1 17.7 22.1 26.1 26.7
Germany 20.5 28.9 34.6 38.1 44.3
United Kingdom 24.5 30.2 40.6 45.9 48.6
Other 22.5 30.2 41.6 45.7 51.9
Other Europe 15.2 20.3 27.2 30.7 35.2
Japan 6.7 10.0 16.8 17.8 20.1
Australia, New Zealand, and
South Africa 10.6 14.1 18.2 20.1 21.5
Total developing (percent) 25% 29% 38% 35% 34%
Developing countries 47.9 74.0 148.3 146.6 163.9
Latin America 23.7 33.3 51.6 57.3 60.6
Other Africa 4.5 6.0 10.1 10.2 13.2
Middle East 11.1 22.2 64.1 57.4 66.5
Other Asia and Pacific 8.6 12.5 22.5 21.7 23.6
International and unallocated 5.8 9.6 17.2 13.7 13.5
The European Communities (9) was established in 1973, Estimates for 
earlier years are the sum of estimates for the European Communities 
(6), Denmarl) Ireland, and the United Kingdom.
—  l 9  “*
The table above shows that sales in current dollars 
have increased from 108.5 billion in I967 to 51^*7 bil­
lion in 1976. Except for mining and smelting, all indus­
tries have grown at a very substantial rate during the 
ten year period. When we examine the sales by area fig­
ures we see that the developed countries accounted close 
to three-quarters of the total sales until 197^ when 
speedily increasing oil prices brought the share of de­
veloped countries down to less than two-thirds of the 
total. This is understandable since the greater part of 
the oil is sold by United States affiliates located in 





As it has already been mentioned, the purpose of 
this study is to compare the total risk of United States 
multinational corporations with that of United States 
domestic firms during a given period (1965-1978)•
Our hypothesis is that the total risk of U.S. multi­
national corporations as shown by their cost of equity 
capital or their earnings-price ratio has decreased in 
relation to that of domestic firms. We assume that the 
factors leading to such a relative decrease in the risk 
of multinationals arises from the maturing (sophistica­
tion) of both the host countries and the multinational 
firms themselves. Moreover, we assume that improvements 
in communications had positive effects towards decreasing 
the risk of operating abroad. These factors will be ex­
plained in detail in the next chapter as we shall pri­
marily attempt to show the increasing sophistication of 
the attitude of the host countries towards the multi­
national firm. After that, we shall carry out the tests 
that will attempt to check out the validity of our hypo­
thesis. We shall also analyse the results and produce 
extensions. The rest of this chapter will explain how 
the sample of firms used in the tests was selected, which 
methods are used to measure risk and which statistical 
techniques are used and why.
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The reason why we begin with 1965 and not an 
earlier date is that there were not enough multina­
tional firms to form a sizeable sample before that 
(Kohers, 1971:65-66). We have chosen 28 multinationals 
and 28 domestics. This was the maximum number of 
industrial firms we could select within the constraints 
of a minimum size for all the firms in the sample, a 
maximum multinationality for the domestics and a mini­
mum multinationality for the multinationals. The main 
reason for selecting industrial firms is to have a 
greater degree of homogeneity in the sample. Accor­
dingly, we selected only those firms which were among 
the Fortune directory of the top 500 largest U.S. 
industrial corporations and of these corporations, 
those which had only 10 percent or less of their sales 
abroad were defined as domestics and those which had 30 
percent or more were accepted as multinationals. As 
can be expected, the average sales abroad of the multi­
nationals in the sample will be above 30 percent and 
that of the average domestic will be less than 10 per­
cent. After 1974, due to increasing foreign content in 
many large U.S. firms, we established the norm at 15 
percent or less for domestic firms and 35 percent or 
more for multinational firms. The average difference, 
of course, was far larger than 20 percentage points. 
The degree of multinationality of each firm has been 
established from various studies (Bruck and Lees, 
1968. Fatemi et al., 1976:301-311. Kohers, 1971:
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301-311. Value Line Investment Survey) already carried 
out as well as the reports of the companies them­
selves. In addition, we have contacted some of the 
companies directly when this was necessary. The full
list of the domestic and multinational firms as well as
the Standard Industrial Classification group they 
belong in are shown below;








1. Standard Oil Ohio
2. Union Oil of California








2. McGraw-Ed i son
3. Roper Corporation
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3. Warner & Swasey























1. Babcock & Wilcox
2. Hoover Universal Inc.
3. American Can




1. Engelhard Mineral and
2. St. Joe Minerals
b. Domestic :
















INVESTOR'S SELECTION OF STOCK 
AND THE EVALUATION OF RISK
We shall base our reasoning on the premise that 
there is a trade-off between risk and return. The 
higher the risk, the higher will the return required by 
the investor to compensate for that risk be. Likewise, 
the lower the risk the lower will the required rate of 
return be.
We shall make use of three measures of risk.
1. The earnings-price ratio (earnings yield).
2. The cost of equity capital based on the divi­
dend valuation model.
3. The systematic risk as measured by the beta of 
the capital asset pricing model.
An examination of each method follows:
The earnings-price ratio:
The earnings-price ratio or earnings yield is sim­
ply the reciprocal of the price-earnings ratio which is 
apparently the most widely used stock evaluation method 
in the world of investment. Simply defined, the price- 
earnings ratio is the average price during a year 
divided by earnings during the same year.
The reason why we prefer to use the earnings-price 
ratio rather than its more frequently employed recipro­
cal, the price-earnings ratio, is to make clearer and 
more direct comparisons with the cost of equity capital 
and the betas, both of which are assumed to increase
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when risk increases. Obviously, the reverse is true 
for a multiple like the price-earnings ratio which is 
assumed to vary inversely with risk.
Accordingly, a strong, successful and promising 
company tends to sell at a higher price-earnings ratio
(consequently at a lower earnings-price ratio) than a
weaker, less promising and less successful one (Graham, 
Dodd and Cottle, 1962:230).
The main factors influencing the price-earnings 
(or the earnings-price) ratio may be the following 
(Graham et al., 1962:230).
1. Those factors that are fully reflected in the 
financial data (tangible factors).
a. growth of earnings and, past sales;
b. profitability;
c. stability of past earnings;
d. the dividend rate and record;
e. financial strength, or credit standing.
2. Those factors which are not reflected openly 
in the data (intangible factors).
a. quality of management;
b. nature and prospects of the industry;
c. competitive position and individual 
prospects of the firm.
The above factors indicate that the price-earnings 
ratio or its inverse, the earnings-price ratio reflects 
to a great extent the judgment of a firm by the market.
According to Amling, the significance of the 
price-earnings ratio is related to the expectations of
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investors about future earnings of the firm. Investors 
will pay more for a current dollar of earnings if they 
expect earnings to increase substantially in the 
future. Hence, a firm which promises to have a future 
growth of earnings will sell at a higher price-earnings 
ratio and one with expected declining earnings will 
sell at a low price-earnings ratio (Amling; 1978:471). 
As we assume that the vast majority of investors are 
risk-averse, the stability of earnings will influence 
the ratio. Hence, if a share's earnings have been 
unstable in the past and are expected to be unstable in 
the future as well, the market will tend to underprice 
it in relation to its earnings because of the instabi­
lity. Hence, there will be a low price-earnings ratio 
and inversely a high earnings-price ratio (earnings 
yield). As we mentioned above, the stability of 
earnings is not the only factor influencing a share's 
riskiness. Nonetheless, it is a very important factor.
The price-earnings figures, from which we derived 
the earnings-price ratios, in this study have been 
taken from Value Line Investment Survey which defines 
them as the average annual prices of the stock divided 
by its annual earnings per share as reported by the 
company.
The cost of equity capital using the dividend 
valuation model
The present price of a share of common stock 
depends upon (1) the cash flow investors expect to 
receive if they buy the stock and (2) the riskiness of
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these expected cash flows. The expected cash flow, in 
turn, is composed of two elements: (1) the dividend
expected in each year and (2) the price investors 
expect to receive when they sell the stock at the end 
of the year (Weston and Brigham, 1978:639. Gordon, 
1962:46-47).
If a firm reinvests a constant proportion of its 
earnings and such reinvestments, on average, produce a 
given constant return, it can be accepted that divi­
dends will grow at a constant rate.* The price, Por of
the share to the investor will be
D, D.(1 + g) D,(1 + g)^
Pq = --------  +   2+  3 + • • • +(1 + k ) (1 + k^)^ (1 + k^)jc 0 e
D, (1 + g)t
where is the dividend at the end of the current 
period which is assumed to have just started, kg is the 
market capitalisation rate or the cost of equity capi­






* Under such an assumption, the growth rate of divi­
dends would equal that of earnings.
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The sum in the bracket is an infinite series. When 
simplified, it becomes
1 +  kg
1 - (1 + g)/(l + kg) kg- g
Inserting it in the equation above, we have
from which the cost of equity capital is derived as
ke + g.
Po
In this research, kg will be calculated in two 
manners. First, it will be calculated in the same way 
as Kohers ( 1975:122) did. D-|/Po is obtained by adding 
up the dividends per share in quarters 1 through 4, and 
dividing the total by the market price per share in 
quarter 1. The same procedure is used for the next 
quarter, except that the dividends per share for
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quarter 1 are dropped and those in quarter 5 added. In 
the denominator, the market price per share of quarter 
2 is used.
The percentage change in dividends per share from 
one quarter to the next is taken as the growth rate 
(g). Hence, the cost of equity capital of a particular 
company during the first two years will be as such:
1965/1 : D/P: 1965/1 , 2, 3, 4 % change in D from
1965/1
1965/1 to 1965/2
1965/2 : D/P: 1965/2, 3, 4, 1966/1 % change in D
1965/2
from 1965/2 to 1965/3
Secondly, kg will be computed by adding the divi­
dend yield to the expected future annual growth of
cash flow earnings, both of which are taken from Value
Line Investment Survey. The dividend yield is the sum
of the periodic dividend declarations during each year 
divided by the average annual price during the year.
The cash flow earnings per share is defined as the net 
income plus non-cash charges, chiefly depreciation, 
depletion and amortization, less preferred dividends 
(if any) divided by common shares outstanding at year 
end. The annual rates of change (growth) are calcu­
lated as a compounded annual rate of change from the 
latest three-year base period to the three year period 
3 to 5 years hence (Bernhard:23, 34 and 42).
These growth rates are estimated by Value Line 
every year. They are ex ante or forward-looking.
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Hence, they may or may not be the same as the actual or 
ex post growth rates. For instance. Value Line of 1965 
may predict ex ante that the growth rate of a certain 
corporation will be eight percent for the next three 
years. However, after three years, in 1968, we may see 
that the ex post actual growth may have been less or 
more than the ex ante forward-looking Value Line esti­
mated growth.
We believe that the second method not only 
reflects the investor's attitude better, since Value 
Line is very widely used by investors, but also it 
makes growth forecasts which are based on a much longer 
base period in the past and extends in the farther 
future. Hence, the interpretations will be based on 
the second method and the first method will simply be a 
double check. This will be elaborated in Chapter 8.
The cost of equity capital, kg, will, of course, 
contain a risk premium. Hence, if one firm's cost of 
equity capital is higher than another's, we shall 
assume that this is due to the higher risk associated 
with the first firm. Thus, a higher cost of equity 
capital will mean a higher risk and this is due to a 
risk-return trade-off.
The betas of the capital asset pricing model
As we mentioned it before, the cost of equity 
capital of a share gives us the risk premium in addi­
tion to the risk-free rate. This risk premium corres­
ponds to the total risk of a share. However, we can
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diversify our securities to such an extent that the 
unsystematic risk, that is the risk particular to the 
share, will be eliminated and we shall be left with 
systematic risk which is the risk pertaining to the 
market as a whole. In other words, by efficiently 
diversifying our portfolio of securities, we can elimi­
nate the unsystematic risk component of the shares and 
we shall be left with systematic risk. The beta is a 
measure of the sensitivity of a stock's price to 
overall market fluctuations. A beta of 1.50 indicates 
a stock is likely to fluctuate 50 percent more than the 
general market in either direction.
Before explaining further the significance of the 
betas, we shall briefly go over the steps involved in 
computing a beta. First of all, we have to find a 
holding-period rate of return. A holding-period rate 
of return measures the total return an investor could 
have realized had he held the asset during the period 
being studied (D'Ambrosio, 1976:346).
Its formula would be
r  = P t  .P t  -  1 ..+ D t  hp Pt - 1
where
r^p is the holding period rate of return;
Pt is the ending price for the period in
question;
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Pt - 1 is the beginning price for the period, and
Dt is the cash received during total time.
Then, the holding-period rates of return of both 
the individual asset and the market index, in which the 
asset is traded, are calculated. They are usually cal­
culated weekly, bi-weekly, monthly, quarterly, etc., 
using no fewer than five years of data. The market in­
dex could be the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, the 
Standard and Poor's 500, the New York Stock Exchange 
Composite Index, etc., when one deals with American 
firms (D'Ambrosio, 1976:347).
Next we compute the characteristic line. The cha­
racteristic line depicts the relationship between the 
rate of return on a single asset and the rate of return 
on the market for all assets (the market index). We 
take points, i.e., the individual asset's return, the 
dependent variable on the ordinate and the return of 
the market, the independent variable on the abscissa. 
The characteristic line is an ordinary least squares 
regression line. The object is to minimize the sum of 
the squared deviations of the points from the regres­
sion (characteristic) line that graphs through the plot 
of all the observations. The beta is the slope of the 
regression (characteristic) line thus computed. Thus, 
the beta tells us the extent to which we can expect a 
change in the rate of return when the market's
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predicted rate of return is given. The greater the 
slope of a chacteristic line for a stock as depicted by 
its beta, the greater its systematic risk. The market 
beta will be equal to one (D'Ambrosio, 1976:334).
The betas in this study have been taken from Value 
Line Investment Survey. Value Line betas use the New 
York Stock Exchange Composite Index as the measure of 
the market index (Bernhard:10-12 and 41-42). The indi­
vidual asset (stock)'s rate of return and the New York 
Stock Exchange Composite Index rate of return are cal­
culated weekly over a period of five years and the beta 
is derived from a regression analysis as described 
above.
On average, betas explain about 30 percent of an 
individual stock's price changes. But for some stocks, 
the beta explains very little of the price fluctua­
tions. Every stock has its own inherent sensitivity to 
the general market. Sometimes a stock's price change 
is "in phase" with the market as a whole. At other 
times, it is not. The more frequently a stock moves 
with the market as a whole, the more its price action 
is explained by the market. So it is quite possible
for a share to have a beta of .50 and to be quite risky 
(Bernhard:10). Then, only a small proportion of its 
total risk is due to its sensitivity to the market as 
measured by its beta. Hence, we must bear in mind the 
limitations of the beta. As Van Horne (1977:186-187) 
states it.
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One assumption in the capital-asset pricing 
model is particularly crucial, and that is 
that the cost of insolvency or bankruptcy is 
zero. If a firm fails, assets presumably can 
be sold for their economic values without 
selling or legal costs... . It is important 
to recognize that the probability of a firm's 
becoming insolvent depends on its total risk, 
not just its systematic risk.
Other factors like the borrowing and lending rate dif­
ferential, transaction costs, availability and cost of 
information, etc., make the total risk more important 
than just the systematic risk. Taking these aspects
into account, this study will place the essential 
emphasis on total risk. Moreover, investors are tradi­
tionally more prone to use total risk than the beta 
which has become popular in practice only in the early 
seventies. The betas have been included in the study 
primarily to show how total risk compares with the 
betas during the period under study.
A final point concerns the derivation of the cost 
of equity capital using the capital asset pricing 
model. According to D'Ambrosio (1976:427-428), the 
formulation would be
ri = Rf + (r^ - Rf)bi
where
fi is the arithmetic mean return on the asset 
being analyzed,
R f  is the mean of the risk-free asset during the 
period studied,
is the arithmetic mean return on the market 
portfolio, and
bf is the calculated beta for the asset being 
analyzed.
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Under a set of assumptions, among which is perfect 
markets, this formula should theoretically give us the 
same results as the Gordon (dividend valuation) model 
' would.
It can, however, be observed from the formula that 
the cost of equity capital of a specific asset is 
essentially dependent on its own beta since it consists 
of the same risk-free asset which is added to all indi­
vidual betas which, in turn, are multiplied by the same 
coefficient, the difference of the market return and 
the same risk-free return. Therefore, if the betas 
show a trend which is dissimilar to the corresponding 
costs of equity capital, it is obvious that the costs 
of equity capital calculated by the above method will 
also have a trend unlike that of the Gordon model. As 
we shall later see, calculations using our sample indi­
cate that this is the case.
STATISTICAL DESIGN 
Three kinds of statistical tests will be carried 
out. First, we shall use the paired-differences test. 
The paired-difference test
The paired-difference test, which is explained in 
some detail by Mendenhall and Reinmuth (1974:225-229) 
will be briefly described here. This technique is used 
to compare pairs of values in small samples using the 
Student's t distribution technique. It measures the 
level of significance of the differences. Rather than 
taking the average of each of the samples that we want
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to compare, we pair a value in one of the two samples 
with a corresponding value in the other sample accor­
ding to a common denominator. To give an example from 
this study, the 1965 average earnings-price ratio for
the multinational firms^ will be paired with the 1965
average earnings-price ratio for domestic firms (Eo/PpyTfic 
same procedure will be repeated for each year during 
the period under study. The same procedure will be 
used for the betas of the capital asset pricing model 
and for the cost of equity capital according to the 
dividend valuation model. The procedure for calcu­





where n represents the points in time which may be 
years, quarters, months, etc., and di represents the 
difference between the variables which are paired.
We let d and to stand respectively for the
average and standard deviation of the n difference mea­
surements. If represents the average difference, 
then
Ho : Ma = 0
This means that we want to test the null hypo­
thesis that the average difference is zero.
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Using the relationship
d - 0t = -----
we find the student's t value with (n - 1) degrees of 
freedom. We shall carry out the test with values of 
a£. 20 (.10 for each tail). If a = .20, we have an 80 
percent confidence interval. The other values of a are 
.10, .05, .02 and .01. The lowest a value (highest
confidence level) will be taken. Any t value which 
corresponds to an a value less than .20 will be consi­
dered insignificant. Hence, a 95 percent confidence 
interval for the difference between the mean would give 
us
d + t Sd//na/2
where a= .05 or t q25*
Thus, we can see that instead of testing for the 
equality of two sample means, the paired difference 
test examines n points in time. Such a block design 
increases the amount of information to be obtained.
The standard error around the trend line
The standard error of estimate around the trend 











The standard error of estimate around the trend 
line consists of two lines which are parallel to the 
least square trend (regression) line and having a ver­
tical distance Sy.% from it. In measuring stability we 
shall use the standard error around the trend line 
rather than the ordinary standard deviation which is 
the pair of dashed lines parallel to the abscissa in 
the figure. The standard error around the trend line
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takes the trend of each group into account, while the 
standard deviation does not.
If the points are normally distributed around the 
regression line, it can be theoretically predicted that 
about 68 percent of the points will lie between the 
standard error around the trend lines.
The variance, the square of the standard devia­
tion, may be calculated from the following relation­
ship;
and S =
where is the variance, n is the number of observa­
tions Ÿ is the mean of these observations. On the
other hand, the formula for calculating the standard
error around the trend line is:
52 . 1 I , 2. /. I ,
n - 2 V n -z.
where S is the standard error of estimate and are 
the predicted values of the observations. Yf are the 
points lying on the trend line. These are explained in 
some more detail by Spiegel (1961:243) and by Kohers 
( 1971 :90-94). We shall also show how the computed 
values correlate with trend by computing the coeffi­
cient of correlation. To that end we shall use the 
equation
~ I (%est ” Y)
(Y - Ÿ)
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where r is the coefficient of correlation between the
estimated value of Y fY .) which lies on the trendest^
line and the value of Y itself. Y is the mean value.
This coefficient measures the temporal stablility of the 
Y values which are risk measures in the present study.
A trend significance test
Our third test aims at measuring the significance of the 
trend of the period by period differences between multi­
national corporations and domestic corporations as far as the 
costs of equity capital, the earnings-price ratios and the 
betas are concerned.. These period by period differences are 
found by a procedure similar to that employed in the paired 
difference test which was explained above. For instance, if 
we look at earnings-price ratios again, we take a year by year 
difference whereby
di = V u h
where i takes values from 1 to 14, the years 1965-1978 in our 
study. To reflect changes in trends correctly, we put a 
positive sign before the highest negative difference and 
add this to the differences of every period. Obviously, 
the highest negative difference will become zero and the 
other differences will increase by the "positivised” amoui^t 
of the highest negative difference. Since we are sub­
tracting from a significantly negative
trend would support our hypothesis. A hypothetical E/P 
graph is provided on page 41 to show this situation visually. 
In this graph, the largest negative difference is the last 
(14th) year which is 1978. We make d^^ positive and add 
it to all the other year by year differences. Thus, d^^ 
would become zero and, for instance, d^ would become 







We thus have a single distribution with a slope
B1 . We should test the hypothesis that = 0 against
the alternative that 3i  ̂ 0. The method of carrying 
out such a test is explained in detail by Mendenhall 
and Reinmuth (1974:333-336).
If 31 / 0, then y and x can be linearly related. 
Here, y stands for any of the values such as the cost 
of equity capital, earnings-price ratios and betas
while X represents the time periods. 31 0 implies
that a one unit change in x should bring about a signi­
ficant average change in y. The estimator, 3i, can be 
used to construct a test statistic for such a hypo­
thesis test. Thus, we wish to examine the distribution 
of estimates, 3i, that would be obtained when samples, 
each containing n points are repeatedly drawn from the
— ^’2, —
population of interest which is the distribution of the 
multinational-domestic differences in our case. The 
expected value and variance of S*) with n periods will 
be:
E ( = 3 1 r
2 = ___ a2a6i n _I ( x i  -  x)2
i = 1
Using the relationship above, we can construct a z sta­
tistic:
2 - 3 _...
^3i  cy/1 I   ̂ ( x i  -  x)2
Since the actual value of 0 *̂  is unknown, we should 
obtain the estimated standard derivation of 3i which is
where
n - 2
Substituting s for QT in z, we obtain a test statistic
which can be shown to follow a Student's t distribution 
in repeated sampling with (n - 2) degrees of freedom. 
We shall carry out the test with values of a < .20 (.10
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for each tail). If a = .20, we have an 80 percent con­
fidence interval. The other values of a are .10, .05, 
.02 and .01. The lowest a value (highest confidence 
level) will be taken. Any t value which corresponds to 
an a value less than .20 will be considered insignifi­
cant.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE MATURING OF HOST COUNTRIES
This chapter and the next examine changes in the 
attitudes of both the host countries and the United 
States multinational corporations during the sixties 
and seventies. There is also a brief look at improve­
ments which have taken place in the field of communica­
tions .
The importance of such a study is that once there 
is an improvement in communications as well as a matur­
ing in the attitudes of both the host countries and the 
multinationals, then the additional difficulties and 
risks of operating abroad (over those encountered in 
operating domestically) will dwindle. Hence the risk 
premium will fall. This, in turn, on a ceteris pari­
bus basis, reduces the cost of equity capital of multi­
national corporations in relation to that of domestic 
firms.
A greater emphasis will be placed on the maturing 
of attitudes in the host country since this is basical­
ly an exogenous parameter for the foreign investor. It 
is also a more controversial topic than the maturing of 
the multinational firms and improvements in communica­
tions.
This chapter does not deal with the benefits to be 
derived from international diversification. Instead, 
this is left to a later chapter when comparative betas 
(systematic risks) of the multinational and domestic 
firms are examined.
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By the maturing of the host country is meant the 
increasing sophistication of the nation state in its 
relationship vis-à-vis the multinational firm. The 
attitudes of the fifties and sixties were that coun­
tries which played host to multinational firms either 
surrendered unconditionally to such firms and hence al­
lowed them to exploit the country or were very reluc- 
tant to allow them inside, in the first place. These 
nations made life difficult for the multinationals, 
sometimes going to the extent of expropriating and 
nationalizing their assets. At other times a country 
is run by a group who find that it is in their personal 
interest to allow a foreign company to operate with 
high profits. Of course, this interest group closely 
cooperates with the foreign investors and in return is 
rewarded in various ways. The "banana republics" are 
typical examples of this type of host country.
On the other hand, the fifties and sixties wit­
nessed a series of African, Asian, Middle Eastern, and 
Australasian countries gaining their independence. As 
the majority of these countries had undergone a long 
and unpleasant period of colonial domination by various 
foreign powers, there had developed an allergy to 
industrialized capitalist countries. The new nations 
viewed with strong suspicion multinational firms which 
they thought were acting in connivance with the govern­
ments of the countries where their headquarters were
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based. For instance, they thought that a U.S. multi­
national would be a tool of the United States Govern­
ment .
Thus, the multinational firms were, in general, 
confronted with two kinds of governments: those which 
offered them very generous conditions to the point of 
looking like business partners and those which were 
highly suspicious of the multinational firms. The lat­
ter (which constituted the majority of the developing 
countries up to the mid-sixties) were very restrictive 
to the foreign direct investment carried on by multi­
national firms. The multinationals, in turn, were wary 
of such countries.
At that time, the multinational firms had not yet 
matured enough to be able to deal efficiently with such 
countries. In fact, the developing countries they were 
used to dealing with were "banana republics" run by a 
group whose primary motivation was self-enrichment. 
Hence, the foreign investor thought that such govern­
ments best suited their interest and the idea that a
revolution or a coup d'état might bring them down was a 
constant source of worry.
This worry led the investor to require higher 
profits to compensate for the higher risks that might 
emanate from a revolution leading to an expropriation. 
In turn, this raised the anger of those against the 
"obedient" regime, often to the point of staging a re­
volution. The risks in the radical and anti-foreign
investment countries were even higher.
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Even in the developed countries (in Europe for 
example)^ there was a worry that the U.S. multinational 
corporations were gradually taking over and supplanting 
local firms. The very well-known book. Le Défi Améri­
cain, by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber openly expressed 
such worries in the mid-sixties. This book, which was 
read by a very large readership and eventually became 
required reading in a large number of business schools 
in the world, succeeded in spreading the idea that the 
U.S. multinational firms were on the verge of controll­
ing several European countries, and that there was lit­
tle that could be done about it. This analysis aroused 
a wave of reaction against the multinationals in Europe 
and various governments began to take a second look at 
their foreign investment regulations.
It is hypothesized in this study that the host 
governments' attitude towards the multinational firms 
have been gradually softening during the 1965-1978 pe­
riod as they have experienced the benefits to be deriv­
ed from foreign investment. Rather than seeing the 
multinational firm in a simplistic black and white per­
spective, governments began to understand that they had 
to negotiate intelligently with the prospective inves­
tors and that they had to be able to select the kind of 
investment they needed. This became gradually possible 
as the developing countries acquired more numerous and 
more experienced technocrats. So, there has been a
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general move from foreign investment partner govern­
ments to national-interest governments, on the one 
hand, and from emotional, economically inexperienced 
and immature national-interest governments to more 
mature and competent national-interest governments be­
ginning to discern the benefits and the costs of for­
eign investment and striving to obtain the best terms, 
on the other hand.
As Hans Singer (1977:212) puts it:
"A 'development-oriented' government of a de­
veloping country has to create an environment 
in which different economic interest groups 
co-operate and function in a way that is con­
ducive to the development of the economy.
The extent to which the government will be 
able to influence the different economic 
groups will depend on its own bargaining 
strength... . A growth in the ability of the 
LDCs to co-ordinate the investment policies 
of the multinationals (with) their own 
national development plan will facilitate in­
ternational economic integration along a pat­
tern that will avoid glaring economic and 
social imbalances and inequities."
At this stage it is useful to dwell upon the bene­
fits and costs of foreign private direct investment 
from the host country's point of view in some more de­
tail. Starting with the benefits Gerald Meier
(1972:417-420) mentions the following:
a) It helps to reduce the shortage of domes­
tic savings and increases the supply of 
foreign exchange.
b) The presence of foreign capital may not 
only raise the productivity of a given 
amount of labour but it may also allow a 
larger labour force to be employed.
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c) If the investment is product-innovating, 
product-improving or cost-reducing, con­
sumers may then respectively enjoy new, 
better quality or cheaper products.
d ) The government's revenues will be expand­
ed as a result of taxing the foreign in­
vestment profits.
e) There may be external economies like the 
transfer of technological knowledge, mar­
ket information, managerial and supervi­
sory personnel, organizational experience 
and innovations in products and produc­
tion techniques. It can also stimulate 
additional domestic investments. For in­
stance, the initial foreign investment 
can create external investment incentives 
by raising the demand for the output of 
other industries.
As for the costs, they are:
a) Special incentives and concessions, like 
tax holidays, financial assistance and 
subsidies and the provision of additional 
public services, offered by the host 
country.
b) Adverse effects on domestic savings could
arise if foreign investment competes with *
domestic investment.
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c) The return outflow of interest, profit 
and dividends on the accumulated invest­
ments and repatriation of capital may put 
pressure on the host country's balance of 
payments.
After listing the benefits and costs of foreign 
investment, Reuber (1973:241) and Meier (1972:420-422) 
argue that in general the benefits clearly outweigh the 
costs as far as the host country is concerned. This, 
of course, assumes a minimum of rational economic poli­
cy and planning. It is highly probable that this mini­
mum did not exist in the majority of newly-independent 
countries. However, the situation has begun to improve 
in the mid-sixties.
To show that the attitudes of the host countries 
towards multinational corporations making direct 
investments is maturing, we shall make use of two sur­
veys by The Economist, one for Europe and the other for 
Asian countries, as well as other publications for some 
of the countries not covered by these surveys. The 
Economist (1977:5) survey of American companies in 
Europe indicates that European attitudes towards the 
United States subsidiaries has substantially changed 
since the mid-sixties. About 13 years,ago Jean-Jacques 
Servan-Schreiber opened the book that brought him fame, 
that is Le Défi Américain,with the following sentence:
"Fifteen years from now it is quite possible 
that the world's third greatest industrial 
power, just after the United States and 
Russia, will not be Europe but American in­
dustry in Europe."
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Servan-Schreiber was more impressed with the U.S. cor­
porations* organizational ability, flexibility and
dynamism as displayed by their fast entries into areas
of high technology, growth and profitability than by 
their mere weight. Even the dollar weight is non-
negligible. As mentioned earlier in this study. The 
Survey of Current Business shows that United States' 
private direct investment in Western Europe has in­
creased from $14.0 billion in 1965 to $60.0 billion in 
1977, and sales have increased from about $40 billion 
in 1966 to over $200 billion in 1976. American subsi­
diaries' sales which were about 9 percent of the com­
munity's GDP in 1966 w«re over 14 percent lattr (The 
Economist, 1977:5). A substantial part of what
Servan-Schreiber predicted about the takeover by U.S. 
firms of European industries has materialized and yet 
this does not seem to worry the Europeans as it
used to in the mid-sixties (The Economist, 1977:5).
The Economist (1977:6) describes this situation as
"... the calm of a sensible people who needed to be
woken up, but who have rightly failed to panic at what 
journalists and academics have told them."
The main reasons for this decrease of European 
worries are the following (The Economist, 1977:6):
1) In many sectors, Europe can compete with 
the United States.
2) Slow as the process may be, the American 
subsidiaries abroad are acquiring greater
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influence in American corporate decisions 
and are not as easily manipulated by the 
parent company as they used to be.
3) American companies, however American they 
remain in ownership and top management, 
neither act nor are treated by Washington 
as instruments of U.S. foreign policy.
4) They have far less freedom of action than 
what their opponents usually claim. Al­
though they pose problems to Europe's 
governments, trade unions and sometimes 
to local business, they do not escape 
control. In fact, their liberty seems to 
be diminishing even further.
Even when one thinks about the communist parties 
coming to power in France and Italy, the prospects do 
not seem to be too bad. The Italian Communists say 
they will welcome continuing multinational invest­
ments. In their common programme of 1972, Communists 
and Socialists have only one foreign company, ITT, on 
their nationalization list according to The Economist 
(1977:6) which makes the following statements:
1 ) All current Western European governments 
welcome foreign investment.
2) Their employment reasons are stronger 
than ever and will continue to be so.
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3) The local enterprises of multinational 
companies are seldom thought of as multi­
national by public opinion (according to 
a survey carried out by Publicis, a Paris 
advertising agency).
4) American companies are not known to be 
American unless they openly claim to be 
so, like putting the sign "Ford" on the 
front door.
The following comparative figures give some indi­
cation that Europeans had less to fear from United 
States direct investment in the mid-seventies than they 
did in the mid-sixties. In 1964, the world's largest 
200 non-American industrial companies sold only 45 per­
cent of what the largest 200 American ones did. In 
1976, Fortune's non-American top 500 sold 92 percent as 
much as the American 500 and among the world's top 50, 
there were 20 Europeans, only 22 Americans. In 1969, 
there were 7 American banks in the world's largest 10 
against three in 1977 (The Economist, 1977:6).
To make an a fortiori analysis of the situation,
it might be appropriate to look in some more detail at
the possible rise of Italian communism. By and large, 
even American managers on the spot have come to terms 
with it and so have a large number of American head­
quarters in the East Coast. This is what a 1974 State
Department poll indicates (The Economist, 1977:30). 
Some people even thought that the situation could im­
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prove as Communist power might bring labour disci­
pline. The only fear was any damage that could happen 
to the host country's economy as a whole. This worried 
them more (The Economist, 1977:30). The Communists 
have had a milder attitude in recent years towards for­
eign direct investment than they did in the sixties. 
Giorgio Napolitano, a leading Communist, said:
"We are not opposed to the presence of multi­
nationals, just to some of their behaviour."
Another leading Communist, Eugenio Peggio, made the
following statement:
"We do not want to shut them out... or cause 
them to leave the country... we welcome a 
contribution to the policy of development 
that we believe is necessary."
These statements lead one to believe that the Communist 
view was not one of laisser-faire but as in Canada, one 
of authorization, for those investments which were 
thought to be beneficial for the country. The foreign­
er would bring in the technology while the state would 
provide the capital. Nor would the foreign multina­
tional supplant a local firm in an already existing 
line of production.
These factors indicate that even the Communist 
proposals are not unreasonable. In addition, they 
guarantee the repatriation of profits and capital. We
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can see that even the "worst" internal political out­
comes in the Western European countries do not look so 
sombre for the U.S. multinationals.
We can now look at another survey of The Econo­
mist , this time about foreign investment in Asia (The 
Economist, 1979). The survey deals with the developing 
non-Communist countries of Asia. Accordingly these 
Asian countries which accounted for 14 percent of the 
stock of private direct investment of OECD countries in 
developing countries at the end of 1967, accounted for
26 percent at the end of 1976. In dollar value, the
investment which was $4.9 billion in 1967, rose to 
$19.9 billion in 1976.
These figures indicate that Asian countries have 
attracted a relatively large amount of foreign invest­
ment. Asia has now the largest stock of foreign in­
vestment among the developing regions which are taken 
as South America, Central America, Asia, Africa, the 
Middle East and the developing countries of Europe (The 
Economist, 1979:6). Foreign investors have been
attracted by Asia's incentives and reassured by the
governments of these countries which provide an image 
of safety. The first reason why Asians do not borrow 
more money rather than taking in foreign investment is 
that, due to financial risk considerations, equity is 
preferred to debt. A second and much more important 
reason is that foreign private direct investment prov­
ides not just finance but also technical know-how.
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all kinds of management skills, jobs and quite often 
marketing arrangements (The Economist, 1979:5-6).
The following tables (4-1 to 4-11) show which 
countries were studied in the survey as well as the in­
centives they offer (The Economist, 1979:8-9). One can 
observe that in virtually all countries the investment 
agencies, most welcome industries, incentives, owner­
ship requirements, restrictions (if any), royalties and 
fees and corporate taxes are explicitly stated. Thus, 
multinational firms are in a better position to know 
what they expect.
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TABLE 4-1 Asia's incentives - Hong Kong
Investment agency; Hong Kong Trade Development Council
Most welcome industries; Machine tools, precision in­
struments, foundries, automa- 
tive parts.




Ownership requirements: No local equity ̂ requirements.
Foreign exchange remittance laws: No limits on divi­
dends or capital re­
mittances.
Royalties and fees: No specified limit on remittanc­
es. 10% of royalties are subject 
to corporation tax.
Corporate Taxation: 17% on all profits made there. No
dividend witholding tax.
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TABLE 4-2 Asia's incentives - India
Investment agency: Indian Investment Centre
Most welcome industries: Fertilisers, insecticides,
electrical equipment, scien­
tific instruments, oil machi­
nery.
Special incentives
for new investors: 5 year tax holiday on profits up
to 7.5% of capital employed; 
grants of up to 15% of capital 
available in backward areas.
Ownership requirements: 60% Indian equity, except for
existing firms with high tech­
nology or large exports, where 
local stake may be 26-49%
Foreign exchange remittance laws; No restrictions on
dividend or capital 
remittances.
Royalties and fees; Usually a maximum of 5% of sales
value, for 5 years.
Corporate Taxation: Basic rate 57i% plus 7&% income
tax surcharge. Dividend withold­
ing tax is an effective 24.5%.
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TABLE 4-3 Asia's incentives - Indonesia
Investment agency: Investment Co-ordinating Board
Most welcome industries: Chemicals, pharmaceuticals,
medical equipment, raw mater­
ial processors.
Special incentives 
for new investors: Priority investors get 2-6 year 
tax holiday on profits and divi­
dends. Import duties waived.
Ownership requirements; 51% Indonesian equity for new 
firms: those established be­
fore 1974 must dilute as they 
expand.
Foreign exchange remittance laws: No restrictions on 
dividend remittanc­
es; capital cannot 
be repatriated while 
firm is receiving 
tax incentives.
Royalties and fees Usual maximum of 10 years; royal­
ties are tax deductible only up to 
2% of sales value.
Corporate Taxation: Minimum rate 20%, rising to 45% on 
profits above $25,000. Witholding 
tax of 20% on dividends, royalties 
and fees remitted abroad.
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TABLE 4-4 Asia's incentives - South Korea
Investment agency Bureau of Foreign Investment Promo­
tion in the Economic Planning Board
Most welcome industries: Chemicals, .electronics, metal




for new investors : 5-year tax holiday on all pro­
fits, dividends and royalties; 
levied at 50% of full rates for 
the next 3 years.
Ownership requirements: Normally 50% local equity re­
quired, with exception for 
high technology and exporting 
firms.
Foreign exchange remittance laws: No dividend restric­
tions; up to 20% of 
capital may be re­
mitted each year 
after 2 years of 
operation.
Royalties and fees; Normally up to 3% of sales, though 
flat fees are increasingly common 
- up to $100,000 automatically.
Corporate Taxation; 20% basic rate: higher bands up
to 40%. Dividend witholding tax 
up to 25%. Publicly quoted com­
panies pay lower rates than closed 
companies.
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TABLE 4-5 Asia's incentives - Malaysia
Investment agency Federal Industrial Development 
Authority
Most welcome industries: Chemicals, wood products, 
food processing, animal feed- 





for new investors: Priority sectors get 2-10 year 
tax holidays, depending on loca­
tion, technology and export per­
formance.
Ownership requirements: Aim is to have 70% Malaysian 
ownership by 1990 (30% Malay, 
40% other Malaysian). Excep­
tions for high technology and 
exporting firms.
Foreign exchange remittance laws: No restrictions on 
dividend or capital 
remittances.
Royalties and fees: Usually 2-3% of sales,
years.
for
Corporate Taxation: Basic rate 40%, plus 5% develop­
ment and, for some 5% excess pro­
fits tax. No witholding tax on 
dividends.
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TABLE 4-6 Asia's incentives - Pakistan
Investment agency Investment Promotion Bureau
Most welcome industries; Chemicals, steel mills, ship­




for new investors; 5-year tax holiday for firms set­
ting up in depressed regions, 
others receive tax credits. Spe­
cial rebates on exports.
Ownership requirements: No legal requirements, but
joint ventures are favored - 
51% local participation.
Foreign exchange remittance laws: No restrictions on 
dividend or capital 
remittances.
Royalties and fees: Generally 3% of sales for 5 years, 
although favoured products may be 
allowed up to 5% of sales.
Corporate Taxation: Foreign companies usually subject 
to 50% profits tax. 15% dividend 
witholding tax.
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TABLE 4-7 Asia's incentives - Philippines
Investment agency Board of Investments
Most welcome industries: Chemicals, steel mills, ship­
building, electronics, farm 
products, wood products.
Special incentives 
for new investors : Accelerated depreciation allow­
ances, and partial tax holidays 
for up to 10 years.
Ownership requirements: 60-70% local equity required
for most projects; favoured 
new entrants can start at 100% 
but must dilute within 40 
years.
Foreign exchange remittance laws: No restrictions on 
dividend remittances 
or capital for in­
vestments made since 
March, 1973.
Royalties and fees: Up to 5% of sales, for up to 5 
years, with very few exceptions.
Corporate Taxation: Basic rate of 25%, higher band 
35%, with extra tax of 5% if rate 
of return on capital exceeds 10%. 
10% dividend witholding tax.
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TABLE 4-8 Asia's incentives - Singapore 
Investment agency Economic Development Board




for new investors: Tax holiday of 5-10 years, accel­
erated depreciation, cheap gov­
ernment loans.
Ownership requirements: No local equity requirements.
Foreign exchange remittance laws: No restrictions on
dividend or capital 
remittances.
Royalties and fees: No limits.
Corporate Taxation: 40% profit tax. No dividend with­
holding tax: but tax on royalties
and fees of 20-40%.
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TABLE 4-9 Asia's incentives - Sri Lanka
Investment agency Greater Colombo Economic Commission
Most welcome industries: Electronics, food processing,
pharmaceuticals, leather,
rubber and wood products, 
light engineering.
Special incentives
for new investors: 5-10 year tax holiday, then ex­
porters pay 2% tax on their sales 
and 10% tax on royalty payments.
Ownership requirements: No legal requirements.
Foreign exchange remittance laws:, No restrictions on
dividend or capital 
remittances.
Royalties and fees: 15-30% royalty tax after tax holi­
day ends.
Corporate Taxation: 50% profits tax, plus 5% for for­
eign companies. Dividend with­
holding tax of 33 %.
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TABLE 4-10 Asia's incentives - Taiwan
Investment agency Industrial Development and Invest­
ment Centre.
Most welcome industries; Chemicals, electrical machi­
nery, cameras, transport 
equipment, machine tools.
Special incentives
for new investors: 5-year tax holiday (excluding
dividend withholding tax), or 
accelerated depreciation.
Ownership requirements: No legal requirements, but
joint ventures favoured.
Foreign exchange remittance laws: No restrictions on
dividend remittan­
ces; 15% of capital 
may be remitted each 
year after 2 years 
of operation.
Royalties and fees: Generally 3-5% of sales.
Corporate Taxation; Basic rate of 25%, higher band of
35%. Dividend withholding tax of 
20%. Royalties and fees sent 
abroad are subject to 20% tax.
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TABLE 4-11 Asia's incentives - Thailand
Investment agency Board of Investment
Most welcome industries; Chemicals, electrical machin­
ery, car components, metal 
processing, pulp and paper, 
food processing.
Special incentives
for new investors: 3-8 year tax holiday, plus fur­
ther tax concessions for compan­
ies locating in depressed re­
gions.
Ownership requirements: 51% local ownership; excep­
tions made for priority indus­
tries .
Foreign exchange remittance laws: No restrictions on 
dividend remittan­
ces; 20% of capital 
may be remitted each 
year after 2 years 
of operation.
Royalties and fees: Agreements scrutinised, wide range 
of terms allowed.
Corporate Taxation: 30% rate for publicly-quoted com­
panies, 35% for others. 25% divi­
dend withholding tax, and royal­
ties sent abroad.
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Although governments set up or are partners in 
business enterprises, nationalizations have become nil 
at present. South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan have 
never nationalized any foreign companies. Among the 
other countries, Pakistan was the last to nationalize 
business and that was in the early and mid-seventies. 
It was directed against local magnates (the famous 
"twenty-two families") and foreign investment was hard­
ly touched at all (The Economist, 1979:23). Another 
example would be the Philippines which used to be the 
most restrictive country as far as the repatriation of 
royalties was concerned. Before 1974, it allowed only 
50 percent of the royalties to be repatriated. Today, 
they can all be remitted, but only for five years 
(which might be extended) and up to 5 percent of the 
wholesale output value, which is generous in relation 
to what is generally accorded in the world (The Econo­
mist , 1979:23). So, it can be deducted that the invest­
ment climate has become less risky than before for mul­
tinationals .
The following countries or groups of countries 
which have not been treated in the two surveys above 
have been examined by Price Waterhouse Information 
Guide for Doing Business in... reports.
We have tried our best within the constraint of 
available reports to compare different spots in time, 
like for instance 1967 and 1977, to see if any changes 
in the host countries' attitudes towards foreign in-
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vestment has taken place. These Price Waterhouse 
guides or reports neither treat all countries in the 
world nor do they go back to the sixties for each coun­
try they study. Yet, the following survey of these re­
ports still gives some substantial indications of 
changes in attitudes. The last two countries, Syria 
and Turkey, have been examined from sources other than 
the Price Waterhouse guides. The dates and pages be­
side the names of other countries indicate the dates 
and pages of the respective Price Waterhouse guides. 
Chile (September 1969 and January 1975;8-9).
Chile, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador and Vene­
zuela have ratified Decision 24 of the Andean Pact 
which deals with the treatment of foreign capital and 
trademarks, patents, licenses and royalties. This has 
brought a few restrictions on new foreign investment. 
However, the specific rules are determined by each 
country individually.
Except for the Allende interlude, there has been a 
generally favourable attitude toards foreign investment 
in Chile and the rules of the game have been made more 
explicit by the Decree Law No. 600 of July 13, 1974
which, in some instances, is even more attractive than 
the rules that existed before.
Columbia (January 1971:4 and April 1978:13).
A comparison of the 1971 and 1978 guides indicate 
that the favourable attitude of the Governement towards 
foreign investment is continuing.
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Venezuela (April 1969 and February 1975:4-10).
Until 1974, there were few restrictions on foreign 
investment. The entry by Venezuela in̂ _Jbo the Andean 
Pact will somewhat increase the restrictions and con­
trols on new investors and even existing investors. In 
addition Venezuela has brought Decrees 62 and 63 of its 
own that also restrict foreign investment. Hence, in 
the Venezuelan case, we see a hardening line towards 
foreign investment.
Argentina (September 1970 and February 1975:5-13).
A study of the 1970 and 1975 guides indicates that 
no fundamental changes occurred as far as the attitudes 
of Argentina towards foreign direct investors except 
that the conditions, prohibitions, priorities, prefer­
ences, transfer and reinvestment of profits, repatria­
tion of capital, restrictions, etc., are more clearly 
enunciated.
Central America (February 1969 and December 1976:12).
The official attitude of the respective govern­
ments has been friendly toward private foreign invest­
ment. Only minor restrictions are encountered by for­
eign investors who are accorded the same rights and 
privileges as nationals. In accordance with the Cen­
tral American Economic Integration Agreement, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
have agreed to equalize their industrial development 
laws.
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In order to encourage the transfer of U.S. private 
capital and technology to developing countries, the 
United States Government, through the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation, will, under certain circumstan­
ces, guarantee a firm against political and business 
risks.
Mexico (February 1972 and August 1977;18-20).
The Price Waterhouse Guide of 1972 (p. 12) states 
that "The Echeverria administration has announced its
intention of maintaining approximately the same atti­
tude as its predecessor, with perhaps somewhat more
positive attempts to obtain new investment, foreign as 
well as local, in specific areas of the economy." The 
Law for the Promotion of Mexican Investment and Regula­
tion of Foreign Investment of March 9, 1973 codified
many of the rules by the December 14, 1973 new Law
(No. 20557) on foreign investment. This expliciteness 
is likely to reduce uncertainty for foreign investors 
as this host country's demands and expectations become 
more, predictable.
Brazil (June 1970 and June 1975, Supplement:11-20).
The relatively mild attitude of the Brazilian Gov­
ernment towards foreign investment has become even more 
encouraging by allowing investments in the Brazilian 
Stock Market by the Decree-Law No. 1401 dated May 7, 
1975.
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Uruguay (July 1970 and April 1973;7).
The 1973 Price Waterhouse Guide states that a num­
ber of laws which grant privileges and concessions with 
respect to a variety of taxes, including import and ex­
port taxes, have been enacted to attract foreign capi­
tal. In addition, exemption from income taxes is 
granted to "new industries" for a period of ten years 
and permanently to income arising from the export of 
locally manufactured goods in the proportion that such 
exports bear to total sales. In addition protection 
against competitive foreign imports may be obtained 
under certain conditions regarding foreign investment 
which were already being applied as administrative 
policies. It also has brought a few new limitations on 
new investments but was not intended to be retroactive 
as far as the maximum percentage (49 percent) of for­
eign control is concerned. There are no restrictions 
on the repatriation of funds.
Canada (July 1970, September 1975:9-10 and March 1976, 
Supplement).
Twenty years ago there were virtually no restric­
tions on foreign ownership in Canada. Today, however, 
foreign investors who wish to acquire control of an 
existing Canadian business must demonstrate to a Cana­
dian Foreign Investment Review Agency that their pro­
posed investment will be a significant benefit to 
Canada. It should be stressed such a change will re­
duce possible friction rather than increase it since
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foreign companies (mainly American) which have passed 
these tests are not likely to be very much harrassed 
after that. Canada is the country with the largest 
stock of foreign investment in the world and owes a 
great deal of its high standard of living to foreign 
investment. As the Price Waterhouse Guide mentions, 
"It is not the intention of the Canadian Government to 
block all foreign direct investment in Canada but to 
ensure that such investment will be in the best inter­
est of Canadians."
Australia (February 1970 and June 1978;12-13)«
The Government accepts that foreign capital has in 
the past played a vital role in Australia's economic 
growth and that significant benefits would flow from 
future new investment from overseas. However, while 
encouraging overseas capital, the Government now seeks 
to ensure that new foreign investment is on an equit­
able basis which shares the net benefits between the 
foreign investor and the Australian community. In 
brief, the Government intends to make in advance a 
cost-benefit study of the new investment. This, we be­
lieve, is likely to decrease possible points of fric­
tion that could eventually arise.
South Africa (February 1967 and August 1977:17-18).
It is the South African Government's policy to 
offer encouragement to foreign companies wishing to 
establish subsidiaries or branches in South Africa and 
the high level of foreign investment has had a positive
—  —
effect on economic development. In addition to that, 
the Government decided to supply services or equipment 
to investors willing to go into sectors of high priori­
ty in the 1974-1979 Economic Development Plan.
Kuwait (April 1975:9-12).
With the aim of speeding up growth in sectors 
other than oil Kuwait has adopted the policy of encour­
aging foreign investment to attract the most highly 
developed technology and greatest expertise in these 
sectors. Foreign investors may import their raw mater­
ial free of duties whereas there will be high duties 
for those imported products which have local counter­
parts.
Saudi Arabia (October 1975:11).
In 1964, a Foreign Capital Investment Code was in­
troduced in Saudi Arabia to assist foreign investors. 
Under this code, foreign investment is encouraged for 
economic development projects outside the petroleum 
sector and where projects are approved by the Foreign 
Investment Capital Committee. The same favorable cli­
mate for foreign investment continues today.
United Arab Emirates (January 1976:11 and 14-15).
Ever since the rulers have begun to consider eco­
nomic development more systematically, foreign invest­
ment of capital know-how and personnel has been welcome 
in the U.A.E. provided it is in their benefits. In the 
late sixties, the individual emirates granted special
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incentives like tax holidays, free land, capital and 
elimination of import duties,
Bahrain (November 1977;12).
The main incentives in Bahrain are the absence of 
taxes, the availability of skilled local labour, cheap 
fuel, relatively easy transport and communications and 
the repatriation without restriction of capital, pro­
fits and earnings of any sort.
Morocco (May 1977:8).
The Moroccan Government generally welcomes foreign 
investment as can be attested by the Investment Code of 
1973 which was designed to stimulate such investments. 
The opportunities for foreigners to invest in Morocco 
are particularly good in sectors where the foreign in­
vestor can contribute to the transfer of technology and 
to employment.
Iran (October 1975:10).
The Iranian Government during the Shah's regime 
was well-inclined to foreign investment especially in 
sectors where there was insufficient local expertise. 
In 1979, the Shah's regime collapsed and was replaced 
by an Islamic Republic which, even though is not 
against foreign investment per se, is against what it 
terms the extravagance and erroneous policy of the 
former regime. Although no clear policy has yet been 
enunciated on foreign investment, the majority of for­
eign firms have shut doors in Iran and follow a wait- 
and-see policy until the Government's attitude crystal­
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lizes. For the time being, we can say that the climate 
for foreign investors has deteriorated in Iran.
Syria
An interesting case is that of Syria, a country 
with a Baathist Socialist regime which was known to 
have a hardline attitude towards foreign investment. 
After 1976, Syria became more willing than it was be­
fore to countenance wide ranging attractions for for­
eign investors (Sakr, 1977:66). Accordingly Syria 
offers them tax exemptions for 3 to 7 years and in cer­
tain sectors the right to import construction material 
and furniture free of duty. In addition, foreign in­
vestors are allowed to withdraw capital and profits in 
any currency, subject only to existing Central Bank re­
gulations (Sakr, 1977:67).
Turkey
A 1976 official report of the State Planning Or­
ganization proposes that Turkey should actively invite 
foreign corporations which want to invest in sectors or 
projects deemed beneficial by Turkey, rather than pass­
ively wait for foreign investors to come by themselves 
(Oguz, 1976:164). The main reasons for the increased 
interests of Turkey in foreign investment are financing 
needs as well as the transfer of advanced technology.
Ajami (1979), who makes a survey of Arab coun­
tries' response to the rapidly increasing operations of 
multinational corporations in the Middle East, reaches
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conclusions that seem to be reassuring for the multina­
tionals. Ajami sets out to examine the attitudes of 
decision makers - the educated Arab elite - towards 
multinational corporations. Ajami*s detailed question­
naire covers nationalism, the transfer of technology 
and economic ideology. The survey includes two coun­
tries with contrasting political views: Kuwait and
Iraq. Considering the differences between these two 
societies, the results of the survey show a surprising 
uniformity. For instance, 82 percent of both Iraqis 
and Kuwaitis agreed that multinationals contributed to 
economic growth, development, industrialization and 
local skill formation while 72 percent thought that the 
net contribution of multinationals was positive regard­
less of the costs. Ajami concludes that host-country 
elites appeal to the local public opinion with radical 
rethoric while following more moderate and rational re­
lations with the multinational corporations which they 
publicly criticize. As we shall see a little further 
on, Frank (1980) reached similar conclusions on a world 
wide survey.
Though not exhaustive, the above country case 
examination still encompasses a set of countries where 
the vast majority of the United States' private foreign 
direct investments lie. It would, therefore, not be 
erroneous to draw conclusions from such a set. We have 
seen that except for a few, these countries have made
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the foreign investment climate more attractive and/or 
more explicit. Both of these factors are encouraging 
foreign investment. Hence, this will lead to a reduc­
tion of uncertainty and, we hypothesize, should be one 
of the factors that will reduce the cost of capital or 
risk.
According to Frank (1980:10), Table 4-12 
shows how private flows from industrial to developing 
countries have grown in significance.
In a recent and comprehensive study, Frank (1980) 
indicates that an important evolution has taken place 
in the attitudes of many developing countries and 
transnational corporations. The countries' earlier 
fears of the power of the transnationals have been de­
creasing, and they look at the companies from a more 
pragmatic and less ideological perspective. At the 
same time, the multinationals show a greater concern 
for the developing countries and are more willing to 
adapt their policies and operations to the realities of 
changing national goals in these countries. This se­
cond trend will be treated in the next chapter.
According to Frank, much of the early tension be­
tween host countries and multinational corporations 
after the Second World War arose from an understandable 
determination on the part of many LDCs to consolidate 
political and economic control after long periods of 
foreign domination. The resulting governmental inter-
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vention was negatively viewed by multinational corpora­
tions, By the late 1960s, however, it became increas­
ingly clear to the multinationals that the gist of the 
problem had little to do with ideology. The fact that 
very profitable and stable arrangements were concluded 
with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe is mean­
ingful. These include joint ventures and technology 
sales agreements. With stronger governments and a 
clearer sense of national purpose, the LDCs have gener­
ally been able to offer the multinational firms more 
solid and well-defined conditions (Frank, 1980:25-26).
According to Frank (1980:25-26), with few excep­
tions, multinational firms presently emphasize instabi­
lity, not ideology, as the main hurdle to investing and 
operating overseas. Penrose (1971:237) also writes
that multinationals tend to invest where they think it 
is profitable regardless of ideological considerations 
in the host country. A comprehensive empirical study 
for developing countries by Levis (1979) seems to sup­
port Penrose's view. Levis finds that multinationals 
attach more importance to economic considerations than 
to political ones when investing in developing coun­
tries. Frank (1980:25-26) mentions that instability 
does not necessarily mean political upheavals followed 
by changes in regime. Such conditions may curtail for­
eign investment temporarily but as the new regime con­
solidates its position, foreign investment will recov­
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er. Far more consequential are those forms of instabi­
lity that need not result from internal political up­
heavals. These are threats of political action, chang­
es in conditions of operation such as ownership and re­
mittance regulations, complex and drawn-out bureaucra­
tic procedures, and more generally, the prospect of 
arbitrary and unpredictable alterations in the rules of 
the game after investment decisions have been made. 
Naturally, the foreign investor cannot expect a foreign 
environment which is totally free of such instability 
and arbitrariness. However, there is a certain maximum 
level which is tolerable.
Major reasons that hamper stability in most LDCs 
are mass poverty and explosive population growth. Ac­
cording to Frank (1980:27-29), there are five forces of 
a more general and fundamental nature that lead to in­
stability and tension between the LDCs and the multi­
national firms.
Rapid Growth and Increased Bargaining Power: Rapid
growth normally gives increased bargaining power to de­
veloping countries. Rapid growth means increasing 
Gross National Product. In turn this means an increas­
ing internal market which may cross the threshold for 
an even more quickly expanding internal market for the 
type of discretionary products which many multination­
als specialize in. Moreover, a sustained increase of 
per capita GNP often brings along better education and
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technical skills, infrastructure and institutions that 
attract multinationals which then invest not only for 
the local market but also for exports from the host 
country. However, these developments will also alter 
the conditions under which the original agreement be­
tween the host country and the multinational corpora­
tion took place. The conditions of regulation and con­
trol applicable to foreign entreprise change, thus 
undermining the basis for incentives and priorities 
accorded to it.
Altered National Goals: As the socio-economic struc­
ture of a country changes, its national goals may be 
altered concomitantly. For instance, at an early stage 
of development, a country may be contented to have mul­
tinationals working for import substitution. After a 
certain while, however, the host country may feel that 
this is insufficient and may demand export-oriented 
production as well. As the domestic market becomes 
saturated with domestic goods and the limits of import 
substitution become apparent, a country may shift to a 
policy of export promotion involving a devaluation of 
its currency^ a possible reduction of protective tariffs 
and other penalties and rewards to encourage exports. 
In addition to this, the host country may ask the for­
eign investors to help bring about a more equitable 
distribution of income and the reduction of unemploy­
ment. Such shifting priorities create an atmosphere of 
uncertainty for the multinational corporations.
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The Obsolescing Bargain: The obsolescing bargain is
especially apt to take place in the case of natural re­
sources where the host country may have a greater de­
gree of leverage. Factors, such as the volume of pro­
duction, control of the operations, pricing of the pro­
duct and the division of the profits, may lead to a re­
negotiation of the original deal. A striking but not 
unique example may be seen in the developments that 
took place in countries that are members of the Organi­
sation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) after 
1973.
Scapegoating: Multinational corporations have often
been used as scapegoats in both developed and develop­
ing countries when governments face difficult straits 
while trying to satisfy the needs and aspirations of
their people. They may be blamed for stifling local
entrepreneurs, meddling in local politics, being tools 
of the home country (especially the United States) and 
destroying the indigenous culture. They may also be 
accused of trying to make profits at the expense of
public welfare. These accusations, whether they be 
real, imagined or exaggerated, are apt to be used to 
divert the attention of public opinion away from the 
problems faced by the government.
Succession of Dilemmas: At a certain stage of develop­
ment, a country may want advanced technology that is
capital intensive. At another stage, it may want 
less-advanced and more labour-intensive technology
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which could alleviate rising unemployment. At times 
the repatriation of profits by the multinational may 
look bad. At other times, the reinvestment of these 
profits in the local economy may look bad because it 
may convey the feeling to some people that it wants to 
increase its control over the host country. As they 
attempt to resolve dilemmas such as the above, develop­
ing countries are shifting their policies in response 
to their changing perceptions of how to maximize their 
gains from the foreign investment process.
After stating the above forces, Frank continued 
his study which is based on detailed interviews with 
top management from 90 multinational corporations based 
in the United States, Japan, Australia, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, France, Sweden and other European 
countries. The results of these interviews show that 
the five forces mentioned above are indeed those 
thought to have top priority by higher management. 
Thus, clear and well defined goals which have less 
chances of eventually changing are very important fac­
tors for foreign investors. According to Frank 
(1980:40-42), the majority multinational corporations 
gave Asian countries, particularly Mafysia and India, 
high marks for the clarity with which they express 
their general development objectives. Except for 
Nigeria, African nations, too, were also seen in that 
light. However, the top managers held a generally
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dimmer view of Latin American and Caribbean countries. 
Still Brazil and Colombia were cited as having clear 
and well-defined goals while Peru and Mexico were 
thought to have more ambiguous goals. Multinationals 
mentioned that, just as in developed countries, it was 
possible to see goals which were contradictory in 
developing countries. For instance, a host country may 
require that corporations build small-scale labour- 
intensive facilities and may then ask them to export 
despite the generally higher costs of this mode of pro­
duction. Sometimes, the utopie goals set by developing 
countries may be impossible to carry out due to admin­
istrative, legal, financial, cultural and technological 
constraints. Moreover, two neighbouring countries 
which started with import-substitution oriented foreign 
investment may both end up simultaneously requiring the 
multinationals to export into each other's market. Des­
pite these inconsistencies, most multinationals felt 
that developing countries made their goals clearer. 
Also, despite their flamboyant anti-multinational cor­
poration public declarations, the host-country techno­
crats become far more reasonable in private negotia­
tions. Multinational firm managers asserted that 
developing country technocrats realized both the bene­
fits of foreign investment and the total disregard of 
local firms towards national goals. Multinationals 
which produce consumption goods that are not indispen-
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sable for the economy try even harder to conform to 
national goals since they have less bargaining power. 
Few multinationals thought that these conflicts are 
fundamental or irreconcilable. They mentioned that the 
disagreements are usually on matters of detail and de­
gree and are less important than the underlying common 
interest. Hence, they generally suggested that differ­
ences could be resolved through negotiation and compro­
mise. Most multinationals stated that they would like 
host countries to define their national goals clearly 
in a legal and regulatory framework. Thus there would 
be less chances of potential conflict.
When Frank (1980:111-112) asked the multinationals 
about deterrents to investment, they generally said 
that deterrents to investment in the developing coun- , 
tries are matters of degree, not absolutes. For in­
stance, a policy like export requirements may be accep­
table when pursued in moderation. However, if it is 
pushed to extreme, it may make it intolerable for the 
foreign investor. Naturally the level of tolerance 
will change according to the bargaining power of a 
firm. Resource firms do not have much leverage since 
they have to go where the minerals are. The firms 
found that the instability and uncertainty resulting 
from it are the most important deterrents. Instability 
is seen in two forms. First, it arises from the sudden 
and frequent changes in government or in government 
policy dealing with major changes in the rules of the
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game which affects both parties. Secondly, a lack of 
clarity in goals causes day-to-day arbitrariness and 
inconsistencies of interpretation of laws and regula­
tions. However, the managers said these two sorts of 
instability were to be found in both developed and 
developing countries. They stated that if the terms of 
operation are clear and stable, they can invest any­
where regardless of the stringency of the regulations 
as long as there is some margin for profit. Subsidiar­
ies in Eastern Europe were mentioned as an example to 
this kind of consideration. This does not mean that 
host country regulations and ideology do not matter at 
all. However multinational managers saw them as much 
less important than instability and unpredictability 
which they felt was decreasing.
Frank (1980:146) states that longer contact and 
experience with multinationals has given host-country 
governments a better understanding of how the multi­
national firms operate and an appreciation that the re­
lationship need not be of a zero-sum kind but one which 
can be beneficial to both parties. In many developing 
countries, stronger economies as well as better trained 
individuals have led to greater competence and cool- 
headedness vis-à-vis the multinational corporations. 




THE MATURING OF THE MULTINATIONAL FIRMS 
AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
THE MATURING OF THE MULTINATIONAL FIRMS 
Corporations and business entreprises in general 
are in a continuous process of evolution, modernization 
and sophistication. This is true from both the tech­
nical, organizational and managerial points of view. 
More and more people of higher calibre are joining the 
ranks of entrepreneurs, business executives and 
experts. For instance, a study of the educational 
level of entrepreneurs by Douglass (1976:41) indicates 
that college graduate entrepreneurs who were only 6 
percent of the total in 1961 rose to 28 percent in 
1975. This was a much faster increase in comparison to 
the educational process of the United States' popula­
tion in general. Another study by Weller (1973:25-26 
and 36) shows that the number of Ph.D.'s and D.B.A.'s 
entering the ranks of business executives, advisors and 
consultants is rapidly growing. Hence, it would not be 
far-fetched to state that managerial competence in 
business firms is on the increase. This should be 
especially true of the multinational firms which are 
usually large corporations with ample resources which 
enable them to acquire top talent. For instance, in 
the mid-sixties, quantitative political risk analysts 
were a rarity even among very large multinationals. It 
was a novelty even among academics. However, by the 
late sixties and early seventies the academic research
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on the topic considerably increased and after the mid­
seventies, most multinational firms began to employ 
quantitative political risk analysts or teams of them.
In addition to the improvement of the educational 
background of the line and staff members of the firm, 
the multinationals have become more experienced in 
dealing with the nation states since the fifties and 
sixties. Their attitudes towards international
business has changed. Before, the multinationals were 
thinking of making high profits in a short span of 
time, especially in developing countries. Now, they 
are more inclined to think of operating abroad on more 
long-term basis and to take the goals and requirements 
of the host countries much more into account than 
before. They also hire many more local staff than 
before.
In 1950, Hans Singer had suggested that "a flow of 
international investment into the under-developed 
countries will contribute to their economic 
development only if it is absorbed into their economic 
system; i.e., if a good deal of complementary domestic 
investment is generated and the requisite domestic 
resources are found". This, of course, is also true of 
the contribution of international investment to the 
economic growth of developed industrial countries. 
American multinational firms in the late fifties and 
sixties began to realize the importance of this idea 
and acted accordingly. During that period, the
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contribution of American investors to economic growth 
is what has lead many developed and developing coun­
tries to encourage foreign investment (Wilkins, 1974: 
400).
An interesting finding of Frank (1980:144-146) is 
the basic sympathy among the multinationals for the 
general goals of the developing host countries. The 
managers do not question the legitimacy of host coun­
tries evaluating the costs and benefits of foreign 
investment in the light of the countries' goals. An 
important evolution has taken place in the attitudes of 
multinationals towards the growth process in the 
developing countries and towards their relationship 
with that process. To a much greater extent than in 
the fifties and sixties, the multinationals recognize 
both the diversity of circumstances in the developing 
world and their own need for flexibility vis-à-vis 
individual developing countries. They also realize 
that history need not be repetitive. Thus, the 
developing countries of today do not necessarily have 
to follow the same path as the Europeans did during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Many Third World 
countries are facing dilemmas of population explosion 
and poverty which were never faced by the Western coun­
tries during their initial industrializations.
This kind of understanding has led a major part of 
the multinationals to show a greater willingness to 
accept the constraints set by the developing countries.
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They also realize that these constraints are often 
beneficial in the long run since they reduce possibili­
ties of future frictions. Of course, this kind of a 
maturing of the multinationals may also be due to 
increasing competition which makes them more compromi­
sing. Frank (1980:145) gives examples of such accomo­
dations. Most multinationals employ and train host- 
country nationals for their foreign operations not only 
for unskilled and skilled manual jobs but also for 
technical and managerial positions. The managing 
director of the local subsidiary is often a local 
national. Multinationals, which were formerly reluc­
tant to accept joint ventures, are far more prone to do 
so now.
The reorganization of foreign activities by multi­
nationals is another evolution which is worth dwelling 
upon. The reorganization is oriented towards the mul­
tinationalization of management and of capital. This 
evolution which has been taking place in the fifties 
and sixties is continuing. The essential purpose of 
reorganizing a multinational firm is to try to optimize 
the degree of integration of elements spread geographi­
cally. According to Widing (1973:153-160) and Phatak 
(1971:109), multinationals made more frequent reorgani­
zations of their activities in the seventies. Natu­
rally, there are advantages and disadvantages both for 
centralization and decentralization. Thus the multina­
tional firm should attempt to find an equilibrium
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point. Widing (1973:157) thinks the United States 
firms which tended to underestimate national and geo­
graphical differences in the fifties and sixties were 
overestimating them in the seventies.
Widing (1973) writes that multinational corpora­
tions should be geographically decentralized in order 
to be able to react rapidly to frequent changes in the 
local market. A decentralized organization can be 
according to geographical areas, to product lines, or 
to functions, depending on the circumstances. On the 
other hand, in order to have a general strategy and 
economies of scale, international activities must be 
well integrated to the entire corporation. Most of the 
firms that have been examined have been trying to take 
both factors into account by superimposing an interna­
tional division on a multiproduct and multidivision 
structure in the parent country. Widing observes that 
domestic and foreign operations have little integration 
during the first stages of their growth but become more 
integrated in ulterior stages. Lorange (1976) makes 
similar observations. Thus, such an evolution in the 
organizations of multinationals should lead to improved 
performance and reduced risk.Sadchev (1977:33-39) and 
Salama (1978:259-298) write that the multinationa­
lization of management and capital which means more 
non-American managers and more joint ventures have 
rendered multinationals less prone to conflicts with 
the host-countries besides improving their performance.
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Alpander (1973) mentions that locally recruited 
managers understand the local environment better than 
their expatriate American counterparts.
One must also mention the international advisory 
board which is another development that tends to reduce 
risk. Hill (1976:28-31) writes that the board consists 
of American and non-American business personalities who 
are very knowledgeable of economic, political and 
social problems in their countries. The role of the 
board, which meets on a regular basis, is to inform the 
parent company about the latest developments. The 
international advisory boards could be considered as a 
first step towards the multinationalization of higher 
management. This, of course, should contribute to 
decentralization.
Exchange risks play a very important role in the 
decision as to how much to centralize. In multina­
tional corporations, there are real financial flows 
among the subsidiaries as well as between the parent 
company and the subsidiaries. The parent company could 
supply the subsidiary with goods for which there is to 
be a payment and vice-versa. Also, there are recipro­
cal short and long term agreements which necessitate 
the payment of interests. The multinational corpora­
tion can protect itself against exchange risks by the 
means of a variety of methods which require some 
centralization.
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The leads and lags method consists of delaying 
debts in weak currencies as much as possible while 
paying debts in strong currencies as soon as possible. 
For instance, if the U.S. dollar is expected to undergo 
a devaluation, the American importer could accelerate 
his payments in the stronger German mark and thus 
avoid losses. The German importer, on the other hand, 
will want to wait until after the devaluation which 
will mean a smaller payment in marks but the same pay­
ment in dollars.
The excess liquidities of the parent company 
and/or the subsidiaries could be collected in a pool 
located outside the home country. The parent company 
and/or the subsidiaries which need funds could borrow 
from this pool and thus avoid borrowing from banks. 
This is another method of financing which reduces 
exchange risks.
Another method of reducing exchange risks is to 
borrow money in countries which have weak currencies or 
low interest rates and then lend the funds to subsidi­
aries in countries with strong currencies or high inte­
rest rates.
There is a very widespread use of transfer prices 
among the multinationals. The different fiscal systems 
in different countries lead the multinationals to mani­
pulate transfer prices in such a way that profits look 
highest in the country with the lowest tax rate. 
Hanson (1980:857-865) gives examples of this technique.
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All the above techniques require a degree of 
centralization. However, as we mentioned before, over­
centralization, too, can be harmful. So the multina­
tional corporations need to find an optimal degree of 
coordination. As their experience increases, they 
would naturally reduce their risks by getting closer to 
this optimum.
It can thus be said that the multinational firm 
not only has increased the competence of its personnel 
but also has gained considerable experience in interna­
tional operations. These factors and the maturing of 
the host countries, as explained before, have led the 
multinational firm to think in a longer perspective of 
time and hence to take the needs of the host countries 
more into account. Such an attitude should lead to a 
greater understanding between the multinationals and 
the host countries and thus the possibility of friction 
will be reduced. This, of course, should reduce the 
risks of operating abroad, leading to a lower cost of 
equity capital.
THE IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
The exchange of information between home-office 
and subsidiary management is an important factor in 
coordinating and controlling multinational operations. 
Communications between home-office and subsidiary 
management can be classified into two categories: 
personal exchanges such as visits, meetings and 
telephone conversations, and impersonal communications
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such as regular reports, budgets and plans, telexes and 
letters (Brandt and Hulbert, 1976:57). American multi­
nationals communicate with their subsidiaries on a hea­
vier scale than European multinationals do. American 
multinationals are far more inclined to hold regular 
management meetings on a regional or worldwide basis 
(Brandt and Hulbert, 1976:57).
It is well known that communications have vastly 
and rapidly improved not only during the last two cen­
turies, but also during the last two decades. It would 
be appropriate to quote Clapham (1975:9-10) about the 
development of communications which facilitated the 
growth of multinational entreprise.
In 1934 a man who needed to make personal con­
tact with subsidiary companies in, say, India, 
Malaya, and Australia would have been absent 
from his desk for three or four months; in 1974 
you feel self-indulgent if you allow three 
weeks for the job. Correspondence round the 
world still takes three or four days, but you 
can dial a number in San Francisco or Stockholm 
in a minute; and all the time your computers 
chat away intercontinentally. multinational 
working is no longer adventurous or laborious: 
it is merely normal.
The developments that took place since the fifties 
or early sixties are quite substantial. Telephone com­
munications were relatively time consuming because of 
the waiting time involved and audibility was poor. At 
present, there is not even the need to call the opera­
tor as direct international dialling has become possi­
ble. Moreover, audibility has greatly improved. The
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telex has become very widespread and its technology has 
improved.
World flights have increased in number and speed. 
For instance, the Concorde aeroplane covers the 
distance between Europe and the United States in about 
three and a half hours. This would enable more 
frequent meetings of high-level executives whose time 
is assumed to be scarce.
Examples could be multiplied and we do not want to 
dwell on the obvious. We can conclude that because of 
improved communications, the multinational
corporation's knowledge of what happens in the 
subsidiaries and in the world in general has increased 
in speed, quality and volume. This situation should 





This chapter contains the results of the empirical 
tests which use four different methods. The first 
method deals with the cost of equity capital (kg) using 
forward-looking growth during the period 1965-1978. 
Here, the graphs of actual data as well as the linear
trends are shown for the average of all groups as well
as for each industrial group.
The second method looks at the cost of equity 
capital (kg) with historical growth during the period 
1965-1978. Our main purpose for using this method is 
to compare kg using historical growth with 
forward-looking growth.. Thus, only the overall 
average has been taken into account. As we already 
have explained in Chapter 3̂  on methodology, our
essential cost of equity capital calculation method is 
the one which uses forward-looking rates. For the 
overall averages of both methods, we have drawn linear 
least-square trend lines for the periods 1965-1978, 
1965-1970 and 1971-1978, so as to make a more sensitive 
examination as well as to compare them with Value Line 
betas available only for 1971-1978. For kg with
historical growth, we have also drawn a graph with 
nine-quarter moving averages so as to dampen the sharp 
fluctuations caused by the use of quarterly historical 
data. The resultant smoother fluctuations should 
normally make it easier to see the underlying trends.
The third method deals with earnings-price ratios 
for 1965-1978. The graphs and trend lines of the
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average of all groups as well as for each group are of 
the same types as those done for the cost of equity 
capital with forward-looking growth.
The fourth method looks at the betas of the 
CAPM during the period 1971-1978. Similar figures have 
been prepared for this method as well.
On every figure, time will be shown on the hori­
zontal axis while kg, earnings-price ratio and beta 
values will be represented on the vertical axis. 
Unless thê  contrary is stated, continuous lines or cur­
ves indicate multinational values while dotted ones 
represent domestic values.
After the figures pertaining to one of the above
mentioned methods have been shown, there will be sum­
mary tables listing the results of the three tests for 
each of the four methods. For instance, the first 
method which uses the cost of equity capital with 
forward-looking growth has first been tested for the 
percentage of points lying between s, the standard 
error around the trend line. Thus, there is a table 
which shows the results for the average of all groups 
as well as for each industry group for both the multi­
nationals and the domestics. Another table shows the 
results of the paired-dif f erence test and the trend 
significance test and their respective confidence 
levels. This process has been repeated for each 
method. As we have already mentioned, the second
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method will only have results for the averages of all 
groups.
Finally, there will be two last tables showing the 
test results for the averages of all groups for all 






O OO M1—1 Cr>
'O 1—1u rHfd (d















































-P CTitHf: 1-p If)VD0 O)u T— 1tJ'
tr> CO-H ÇU00 o0 u
r— 1 CP
tj 1—1u 1—4(d fd

























































0 tJiO C1—1 -H1Tl •HUfd 0g p
o gm 0































































o 0o a1—1 •H1TJ Ü
















tjt M-Mtn ü(U•H rH(UOO +J1—1 Ci41 (U»Ü ü
U X
s (U














































• H 0 )
1 • H



































































































































tT>C•HX0 CO0 rH1-4 td1 -p'Ü 0)
U e(0 10Vt 3̂o O44 U
U



















































































































































































U aî3OrH PfO O'U•H iH1—1O (CJ-P
CO m•H o




















































































TABLE 6-1 kp with forward-looking growth
Industry
Group
Percentage of points between s 
Multinational Domestic
Petroleum refining 57.14 71.43
Electrical machinery 78.57 71.43
Machinery, except electrical 64.29 71.43
Chemical and allied products 71.43 78.57
Fabricated metal products 78.57 71.43
Non-ferrous metals 78.57 64.29
Food products 64.29 78.57
All groups 78.57 71.43
TABLE 6-2 kp with
125 -
forward -looking growth
Industry Paired difference Trend significance
Group t value a t value a
Petroleum
refining
6.23 .01 — .12 n. s.
Electrical
machinery






3.68 .01 1.645 .20
Fabricated 
metal products
5.35 .01 .669 n. s.
Non-ferrous
metals
5.71 .01 2.413 .05
Food products 8.10 .01 2.324* .05
All groups 8.65 .01 5.116 .01
♦Contrary to hypothesis.
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TABLE 6-3 kp with historical, growth 
(All groups)








. 1 1 1 n.s.
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A look at the graphs and summary tables of kp with 
forward-looking growth shows us that the results essen­
tially support our original hypothesis, i.e. the cost 
of equity capital of U.S. multinational firms has 
decreased in relation to that of the U.S. domestic 
firms during the period under study.
The percentage of points lying between the stan­
dard error around the trend line is definitely accept­
able for the average of all groups as shown in Table 
6-1. As we have already mentioned in Chapter 3 on 
methodology, ideally, 68 percent or more of the points 
should lie between these standard error lines. We have 
78.57 percent and 71.43 percent respectively for the 
multinational average of all groups and the domestic 
average of all groups. All the industry groups, 
except petroleum refining, yield acceptable results. 
Only in a few cases do they have a 64.29 percent which 
is quite close to 68 percent. Petroleum refining has a 
low 57.14 percent for the multinationals and 71.43 per­
cent for the domestics. Thus, we can say that the 
results are generally acceptable.
As far as the paired-difference test goes, there 
is definitely a highly significant difference between 
the multinationals and the domestics. This is true for 
both the average of all groups and for each industry 
group. They are all significant at a = .01 or a con­
fidence level of 99 percent.
Finally, the trend significance test shows that 
the trend of the difference between the multinationals
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and the domestics significantly (a = .01) supports our 
hypothesis for the average of all groups. The only 
group which shows a result contrary to our hypothesis 
is food products with a = .05. Petroleum refining and 
fabricated metal products do not yield difference 
trends which are significantly different from 0. Elec­
trical machinery, non-electrical machinery, chemical 
and allied products and non-ferrous metals are in line 
with our hypothesis with respective a s of .01, .01,
.20 and .05.
We thus see that the results generally lend consi­
derable support to our hypothesis. Of course, one can­
not claim that such results give an absolute proof of 
the validity of the hypothesis. Rather, one could say 
that these results increase the likelihood of the vali­
dity of the hypothesis.
The cost of equity capital with historical growth 
(calculated according to the Kohers method as explained 
in Chapter 3) yields positive results for the percent­
age of points lying between the standard error around 
the trend line and the paired-dif ference test. 
However, the difference between multinationals and 
domestics does not have a significant trend as may be 
observed in Table 6-3. To an important extent, this 
insignificance is due to the sharp fluctuations of k^ 
values during the period. This shows how much change 
can result from a different growth rate calculation 
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TABLE 6-4 Earnings-price ratios
Industry Percentage of points between s
Group Multinational Domestic
Petroleum refining 85.71 78.57
Electrical machinery 71.43 78.57
Machinery, except electrical 64.29 64.29
Chemical and allied products 78.57 85.71
Fabricated metal products 85.71 71.43
Non-ferrous metals 85.71 85.71
Food products 64.29 85.71
All groups 71.43 85.71
— l48 —
TABLE 6-5 Earnings-price ratio
Industry Paired difference Trend significance
Group t value a t value a
Petroleum
refining
3.330 .01 2.008* .10
Electrical
machinery
5.960 .01 .935 n.s.
Machinery, 4.960 
except electrical
.01 .102 n. s.
Chemical & 
allied products
4.740 .01 2.006 .10
Fabricated 
metal products
4.210 .01 .426 n.s.
Non-ferrous
metals
4.300 .01 3.809 .01
Food products 4.980 .01 1.538 .20
All groups 4.910 .01 1.580 .20
* Contrary to hypothesis
— 149 ”
The average for all groups of the earnings-price 
ratios yields results that support our hypothesis. The 
percentage of points lying between the standard error 
lines around the trend are 71.43 and 85.71 percent res­
pectively for the multinational firms and domestic 
firms. The paired-difference test is significant at a 
confidence level of 99 percent (a= .01) while there is 
an 80 percent ( a= .20) confidence level for the trend 
significance test.
When we look at industry groups separately, the 
percentages of points between the standard error lines 
around the trend are satisfactory. Only non-electrical 
machinery and food products have values of 64.29 
percent. The other groups have values ranging from 
71.43 percent and 85.71 percent. The paired-differ­
ence test shows that all groups are significantly dif­
ferent at a confidence level of 99 percent (a = .01). 
Three groups yield trend significance test results that 
support the hypothesis. These are chemical and allied 
products, non-ferrous metals, and food products with 
respective confidence levels of 90 percent, 99 percent 
and 80 percent. The results for electrical machinery, 
non-electrical machinery and fabricated metal products 
are not significant. One group, petroleum refining, 
has a trend that is significant at a 90 percent confi­
dence level. However, the trend of this group runs 
against our hypothesis. Briefly, we have three groups 
which support our hypothesis, one which goes against it 
and three which are insignificant.
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In general, the results of the earnings-price 
ratios support our hypothesis although not as strongly 
as those of the cost of equity capital with forward- 
looking growth rates. As will be explained in the next 
chapter, economic and political developments of a gen­
eral nature as well as more specific ones are likely 
to influence earnings-price ratios more rapidly and 
in a more pronounced manner than they do the cost of 
equity capital figures with forward-looking growth 
rates. The latter try to take into account long term 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 6-6 CAPM betas
Industry
Group
Percentage of points between S 
Multinational Domestic
Petroleum refining 75.0 75.0
Electrical machinery 62.5 87.5
Machinery, except electrical 87.5 87.5
Chemical and allied products 75.0 87.5
Fabricated metal products 87.5 87.5
Non-ferrous metals 87.5 62.5
Food products 62.5 75.0
All groups 75.0 87.5
—  168 —  
TABLE 6-7 CAPM betas
Industry Paired difference Trend significance
Group t value a t value a
Petroleum 3.186 .02 24.240 .01
refining
Electrical 13.210 .01 .852 n.s.
machinery
Machinery, 7.890 .01 2.470 .05
except electrical
Chemical & 5.690 .01 4.327 .01
allied products
Fabricated 4.830 .01 1.347 n.s.
metal products
Non-ferrous 4.030 .01 4.260 .01
metals
Food products 10.820 .01 1.750 .20
All groups 3.850 .01 3.678 .01
— 169 *”
FIGURE 6-5 8
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An examination of Figure 6-42 shows that the aver­
age beta value of all groups for the multinationals goes 
together with that of the domestics until the end of 1973» 
After that, the two averages fork out with the multi­
national betas becoming higher in relation to domestic 
ones. Thus, we see that systematic risk which was about 
the same for both until 1973 becomes different after that. 
The explanation of this phenomenon lies in the degree of 
interrelationship of the economies of world countries.
Rugman (1979*63-67) looks at the issue through the 
interrelation of world equity markets which became very 
strong after 1972. Wood and Jianakoplos (1979*47-55) 
examine the annual percentage change of the gross domes­
tic products of the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan. As Figure 6- 
58 indicates, they found that starting from 1973» there 
has been a greater similarity in rates of growth of out­
put among the major industrialized countries. One can 
easily conclude that this situation left less room for 
international diversification and hence considerably less 
possibilities for the reduction of systematic risk. This 
is a very probable explanation for the relative increase 
in the systematic risk of the multinational firms after 
1973.
If there were less co-variation of national econo­
mies before 1973 than after, then one would expect re­
turns from multinationals before 1973 to exhibit a lower
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covariance with the U.S. market index than they do after­
wards. It may be assumed that domestic returns have the 
same covariance with the U.S. market index before and 
after 1973» Hence, the betas of the multinationals should 
rise in relation to those of the domestics. The formu­
lation for beta should make it more evident*
Covariance (r^, Rf)
Beta = -----------P— 2--—
%
2where r_, and a respectively denote the market re- m I m
turn, the risk free rate of return and the variance of 
the market returns. Still, this relative increase of 
multinational betas should not be taken as a refutation 
of the basic hypothesis of this study. In so far as the 
value of diversification properties, per se, of overseas 
investment have decreased, one would expect the cost of 
equity capital of multinationals to rise in relation to 
that of domestics. The fact that this is not the case in­
dicates that other factors affecting total risk have 
swamped the changed diversification potential and it was 
stated in Chapter 3 that betas explain only about 30 per­
cent of total risk and for some stocks the beta values 
give a very limited explanation of price fluctuations. 
Thus, it is quite possible to have a quite risky share 
with a beta value of .50. Fogler (1978*109-132) shows 
that the method of computation of betas can drastically
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alter results such that by one method the beta value may 
be higher for Firm A than for Firm B while the reverse 
will be true with another method or other methods. Also 
a fundamental assumption of the capital asset pricing 
model is perfect markets. The stagflation, which set in 
after 1973, did not look like a propitious time to have 
perfect markets.
Other than international diversification, one should 
also look at export diversification. While Hirsch and 
Lev (I97I) show how exports diversification can be bene­
ficial for companies, Pras (1980*32-37) writes that for 
large firms, such as those in our sample, export diversi­
fication plays a more important role than product diver­
sification which has a negligible influence. Export di­
versification is of greater importance for the domestic 
firms in our sample since they either have no plants 
abroad or have them on a much lesser scale than the multi­
nationals. An examination based on the reports of some 
companies in our sample and supplemented by phone calls 
shows that the domestics were greater exporters, directly 
from the U.S., than were the multinationals. Except for 
petroleum refining which may be more dependent on pro­
duct diversification, those other industries, chemical 
and allied products, which run contrary to our hypothesis 
seem to have domestics benefitting more from export di­
versification than the multinationals. We must, however, 
caution the reader about the fact that we were unable to
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obtain data for all firms and for those that we obtained, 
we frequently got a range of values or simply ordinal, 
rather than cardinal, information. This was due to the 
reticence of many firms to give out such information.
It can be seen from Table 6 - 6  that the percentages 
of points lying between the standard error lines around 
the trend are respectively 7 5 * 0  percent and 8 7 . 5  percent 
for the averages of all groups of the multinationals and 
the domestics. Individual industry groups, too, show 
satisfactory results with values of 6 2 .5 , 7 5 . 0  and 8 7 . 5  
percent.
In Table 6-7» we can see that the paired-difference 
test yields highly significant results for the average 
of all groups as well as for the individual groups. With 
the exception of petroleum refining, where there is a 
significant difference between multinational betas and 
domestic betas at a confidence level of 9 8  percent, all 
the results are significant at a confidence level of 9 9  
percent.
As for the trend significance test, we have results 
which generally show that the systematic risk of multi­
nationals has increased in relation to that of the do­
mestics. The average of all groups shows that this trend 
is significant at a confidence level of 9 9  percent. Pe­
troleum refining, chemical and allied products, non- 
ferrous metals and food products are significant at con­
fidence levels of 9 9  percent, 9 9 percent, 9 9  percent and
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80 percent respectively. Non-electrical machinery dis­
plays an opposite trend at a 95 percent confidence level 
while electrical machinery and fabricated metal products 
do not have trends that are significantly different for 
the multinationals and the domestics.
In this study, the betas are not used to prove or 
disprove the hypothesis but are simply an extension that 
shows how the systematic, not total, risk of multination­
als fared in relation to that of the domestics. Obvious­
ly, the CAPM cost of equity capital based on these betas 
will give us the same ordinal results since, by formula­
tion, the two are positively correlated (see Chapter 3)« 
The results for the average of all groups using the 
four different methods are shown in Table 6-8 and Table 
6-9 below.
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TABLE 6-8 Results for averages of all groups
Test Percentage of points between s
Multinational Domestic
kg with forward-looking 78,57 71.43
growth




CAPM betas 75.00 87.50
— iy6 —
TABLE 6-9 Results for averages of all groups
Test Paired difference Trend significance
t value a t value a
kg with forward 8.650 .01 5.116 .01
looking growth
kg with 7.030 .01 .111 n.s.
historical growth
Earnings-price 4.910 .01 1.580 .20
ratios
CAPM betas 3.850 .01 3.678 .01
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CHAPTER 7 
AN ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRY GROUPS
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse each in­
dustry group result separately and on a yearly basis in 
the light of ex ante and ex post information obtained 
primarily from the U.S. Industrial Outlook (yearly from 
1 9 6 5  to 1 9 7 8 ), Value Line Investment Survey reports and 
Standard & Poor's Industrv Surveys. All three are con­
tinuously updated reports trying to predict what the 
prospects for a certain industry are in advance (ex ante) 
For instance, the U.S. Industrial Outlook of I9 6 5 » which 
was actually prepared in 1964 tried to predict the pro­
spects (sales growth, profitability, stability, etc.) 
for, say, the chemical and allied products for 1965 and 
even further. Of course, the predictions may or may not 
be equal to what actually occurs later (ex post). How­
ever, ex ante estimations are particularly important 
since investors normally use this information, among 
others, when buying stocks. Factors such as expected 
growth in earnings, sales or stability will have an im­
portant influence on earnings - price ratios. Besides 
these three major sources, reference was also made to 
company reports which sometimes tried to predict the 
prospects of the industry group to which the company 
belonged. However, more often than not, such reports 
were too optimistic for obvious reasons. Hence, the 
main emphasis was placed on the above three sources which
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rarely contradicted one another in their predictions 
for the same year. All three sources are heavily used 
by investors and thus their predictions are very likely 
to be quite close to those of investors who buy stocks. 
Also, they complement one another. For instance. Stand­
ard & Poor's Industrv Surveys gives substantial and sys­
tematic information on petroleum refining, chemical and 
allied products, fabricated metal products and food pro­
ducts but is rather scanty and unsystematic when it comes 
to the other three groups. On the other hand, U.S. In­
dustrial Outlook gives little or no information on petro­
leum refining. Value Line Investment Survey provides 
complementary information in quite a number of instances. 
Under the light of the information and predictions given 
by these sources, possible and plausible explanations are 
presented for each industry group results as shown in the 
previous chapter.
It must be stressed that the analysis will be car­
ried out for the earnings - price ratios (E - Ps) since 
it is possible to relate these to the information given 
by the above sources. E - Ps are usually influenced 
clearly in the short-term by general as well as specific 
developments, namely those pertaining to an industry or 
a company. It is therefore possible to show, to a cer­
tain extent at least, the relationship between these 
developments and the E - Ps. On the other hand, the 
cost of equity capital calculations, as described in
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Chapter 3» dealing with the methodology, are based on 
long-term forward-looking growth rates calculated by 
Value Line Investment Survey according to a method which 
they only partially explain. Without knowing what Value 
Line * s analysts had in mind when calculating these ex 
ante growth rates for the coming 3 to 5 years, it be­
comes a virtual impossibility to explain the significance 
of these results as an immediate reflection of develop­
ments as we have attempted to do for E - Ps. Still, 
because of the statistical law of large numbers, upon 
which our significance tests in the previous chapter rely, 
we can reach some conclusions for the entire 1965-1978 
period.
Unless thoroughly familiar with the recent economic 
history of the U.S. and its implications for stock prices, 
the reader is urged to read the Appendix, Major Economic 
Events (I9 6 5 -I9 7 8 ), before and/or while reading the ex­
planations to be given for the yearly changes in the E - 
Ps of each industry group. The reader should also note 
that the comparative multinational-domestic E - P graph 
of a group has been placed after its year by year analy­
sis.
PETROLEUM REFINING
At the end of 1964 and the beginning of I9 6 5 , multi­
national oil firms were more vulnerable to international 
competition compared to the domestic oil companies which
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were protected by import quota restrictions. Competition 
for the multinationals arose mainly from Soviet oil bar­
ter for British and Japanese manufactured products.
Still, both multinationals and domestics expected sales 
and net income growth above the average of all stocks. 
Although it was expected that the U.S. dollar would be 
devalued, this was not likely to make U.S. domestic firms 
competitive to foreign oil in world markets. The 7,4 
percent devaluation was far from being sufficient to make 
up for the large price per barrel difference between do­
mestic and foreign oil which stood respectively at 1.85 
dollars and 3.00 dollars. One can say that, overall,
1 9 6 5  gave somewhat better prospects for domestic oil 
which was protected by import quotas as opposed to for­
eign oil which had to face international competition.
This is a very probable explanation for the domestic 
earnings - price ratio decrease in relation to the multi­
nationals .
At the beginning of I9 6 6 , the growth in earnings of 
domestic firms was expected to ease somewhat. At the 
same time, the profits of multinationals were hard hit 
by weak prices and higher taxes in Libya which even 
planned to raise them somewhat more. These are very 
likely explanations for the rises in E - Ps for both 
multinationals and domestics though the latter*s rose 
at a slower rate, probably because investors perceived 
it as more immune to international conjectures.
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While U.S. domestic oil prices were firm, those 
abroad were depressed in I9 6 6  and competition in inter­
national markets was quite severe. Thus, domestics had 
better prospects than multinationals had for making 
larger profits in I9 6 7 . Host countries were seeking a 
larger share of profits than before. In 1967, the E - Ps 
of domestics fell while those of multinationals rose 
slightly. The Arab-Israeli war of June I9 6 7  was another 
factor which worked against the multinationals.
In 1 9 6 8 , prospects for the multinationals were im­
proving even more than those of the domestics. Multi­
nationals were able to resolve the supply and transpor­
tations problems caused by the I9 6 7  Arab-Israeli war. 
Refined petroleum prices in most parts of the world in­
creased. While earnings were expected to grow in I9 6 8 , 
there were still some uncertainties as to prices and 
taxes. The E - Ps of multinationals fell slightly faster 
than those of domestics.
The expected demand slump for I9 6 9  made investors 
wary about both multinational and domestic oil firms. 
However, there were prospects for large oil and natural 
gas discoveries in Alaska. This could have been a factor 
which made domestic E - Ps rise less faster than multi­
national E - Ps.
Although the prospects for 1970 were not too good 
either, earnings fell faster than prices resulting in 
lower E - Ps for both domestics and multinationals. Yet,
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the multinational E - Ps declined more slowly because of 
Middle East oil uncertainties caused by events such as 
the May 19?0 sabotage of the Trans Arabian Pipeline 
which brought some 450,000 b/d of Saudi oil to the Medi­
terranean Sea.
The relative stock prices of both multinational and 
domestic firms deteriorated during 1971. However, that 
of multinationals declined faster because of the uncer­
tainty created by Libya's imposition of extra taxes on 
its crude production. Other oil producing countries 
followed Libya's example.
Earnings were expected to be modest in 1972 for 
multinationals. However, although it later did not turn 
out that way, negotiations between multinationals and 
the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
seemed to take a more optimistic turn. The decline of 
multinational E - Ps exceeded that of the domestic E - Ps. 
The relatively warm U.S. winter of 1972 reduced oil 
prices.
Towards the end of 1973» the Arab oil embargo allowed 
oil companies, especially multinationals, to score very 
high earnings.
At the end of 1973 and during 1974, skyrocketing 
earnings coupled with uncertainties, which kept oil stock 
prices lower than warranted, tremendously increased the 
E - Ps, especially those of the multinationals which 
seemed more vulnerable to world political conjectures.
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In one year foreign oil prices went up by about 350 per­
cent while domestic oil prices increased by about 200 
percent. During 19?4, domestic oil profit prospects 
looked better than those of multinationals to be sub­
jected to windfall profits taxes.
Due to the uncertainties on the world political 
scene in 1975» investors found domestic oil stocks more
9
reliable than multinational ones and the E - Ps of the 
former increased only slightly during the year. Despite 
increasing oil prices, the relative inelasticity of oil 
demand made it fall by only 5 percent. Another factor 
which made multinationals look worse than the domestics 
was President Ford's intention to impose a tariff on im­
ported oil.
While oil earnings began to decline in 1976, inves­
tors expected that they would soon go up again. This 
made prices go up while earnings declined. However, earn­
ings did not go up as expected and this resulted in a 
rapid fall of E - Ps for both multinationals and domes­
tics. The decrease of uncertainties in foreign oil sup­
plies led to an even more rapid decrease in the E - Ps 
of multinationals as compared to the domestics.
During 1977» foreign oil uncertainties began to sub­
side while the world economic outlook had become brighter 
at the end of 1976. Oil demand did not fall as much as 
previously thought. At the same time, strong price con­












investors. During the year, the domestic E - Ps rose 
rather sharply while the multinational E - Ps fell slight­
ly-
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 
Relatively good profit and sales increases realized 
in 1 9 6 4  led investors to believe that these would con­
tinue in 1 9 6 5 . Thus, the E - Ps of both multinationals 
and domestics somewhat declined during 1965-
Despite good prospects during I9 6 6 , E - Ps increased 
because earnings increased faster than prices. The real 
boom was for colour television tubes but this does not 
affect our results since none of the companies in our 
sample dealt with television tubes. Multinationals did 
better in their foreign than in their domestic operations. 
This is a probable reason for the slower rise of multi­
national E - Ps compared to domestic E - Ps during I9 6 6 .
In 1 9 6 7 , the whole electrical machinery industry was 
in a boom and prospects looked bright. Despite substan­
tial increases in earnings, prices increased even faster, 
thus leading to a fall in the E - Ps of both multination­
als and domestics.
Prospects were moderately favourable in I9 6 8 . Yet 
E - Ps were too low probably because electrical machinery 
shares were popular with institutional investors. While 
multinationals were partly sheltered from a 10 percent 
corporate surtax, foreign markets became more competitive
— 186 —
compared to the previous year. In the end, multinational 
E - Ps rose while domestic ones declined.
During I9 6 9 , there were two probable reasons for the 
rise in E - Ps for both multinationals and domestics. 
First, earnings increased faster than prices. Also, to­
wards the end of the year, defense cuts and a less buo­
yant U.S. economy could have contributed to the rise in 
E - Ps.
Net incomes did not keep pace with sales during I9 7 0  
and profitability fell steadily while E - Ps declined.
At the same time, because investors anticipated a good 
future for the electrical machinery industry, prices for 
these shares rose sharply. The multinational E - Ps de­
cline was slower probably because of competition in for­
eign markets.
Although the situation was good in I9 7 I, investors 
had already anticipated that in '1970 and stock prices 
did not increase substantially during 1971* Both multi­
national and domestic E - Ps were relative stable.
During 1972, despite generally higher sales, earn­
ings were declining as a result of keep competition with­
in the temporarily declining U.S. market due to reduced 
capital spending by the electrical machinery sector. As 
demand was better abroad, multinational E - Ps were re­
latively stable while the domestic ones rose.
Disappointment, resulting from the low earnings of 
1972, caused a fall in prices in 1973- However, earnings
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picked up during the year without a corresponding in­
crease in prices. This, coupled with the world recession 
in the last quarter of 1973» caused a high jump in both 
domestic and multinational E - Ps. The higher rise of 
multinational E - Ps was probably due to world uncertain­
ties.
In 1974, there was a peak demand for semi-conductors. 
However, none of the firms in our sample were involved 
in that and, thus, they could not benefit from this event. 
The E - Ps kept rising fast during the year. It was a 
slower rise for the multinationals which found a new 
market for them among the new richer oil producers.
At the end of 1974 and during 1975» there was a de­
mand drop for the U.S. market for electrical machinery 
resulting from a drop in construction activity and a drop 
in demand for generation equipment used by utilities. 
Foreign sales of multinationals continued to pick up. 
During 1975» the multinational E - Ps fell while the do­
mestic ones rose.
The domestic stagnation of 1975 ended in 1976 and 
total industry sales were expected to expand by at least 
8 percent since the housing sector was rapidly recover­
ing. Price increases coupled with lower interest rates 
led to higher earnings and better prospects. This, in 
turn, led to a rapid decline in E - Ps for both domestics 
and multinationals.
After the strong rebound of profits in 1976, the
— 188 —
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year 1 9 7 7  witnessed a slowing down in sales of electrical 
machinery. The situation was made worse for multination­
als which had their foreign earnings negatively influ­
enced by a wave of currency revaluations against the U.S. 
dollar. Thus, while the E - Ps of both domestics and 
multinationals rose, the latter*s rose even faster.
MACHINERY, EXCEPT ELECTRICAL 
During I9 6 5 » prospects were rather good for the non­
electrical machinery. They were much better for the 
multinationals which found high demands for their pro­
ducts. While the domestic E - Ps rose slightly, the 
multinational ones fell considerably.
Although there was a glimpse of promise at the begin­
ning of 1 9 6 6 , tight money policy during the first half of 
the year in the U.S. and then the suspension of the 7 
percent tax credit made these shares, especially the do­
mestic ones which were more affected, less attractive to 
investors. While the E - Ps of both types of firms rose, 
the domestic ones rose even faster.
Despite the off and on tight money policy, 19&7 
looked promising for the machinery industry because of 
good backlogs and spending projects. Earnings showed 
rapid increases in the first half of the year and this 
was translated into even more rapid price increases. Both 
multinational and domestic E - Ps fell. The latter did 
so at a faster pace.
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Earnings began to slow down in the U.S. market dur­
ing 1 9 6 8 . However, sales grew at a faster rate overseas 
Yet this was not translated into lower E - Ps for the 
multinationals. A probably reason might have been inves­
tors' anxiety over the reduction of plant expansions 
abroad. While the multinational E - Ps remained rela­
tively stable, domestic E - Ps fell during I9 6 8 .
Earnings were expected to increase during I9 6 9  and 
they did. Prices also went up but at a slower rate.
Even prospects of a slowdown in the U.S. economy did not 
seem to deter investors from going to domestic shares.
As the demand for petroleum products rose, there was a 
corresponding increase in the demand for oil drilling 
machines. The increase in E - Ps was very slight for 
the domestics and moderate for the multinationals.
Despite some gloom over the cooling economy and 
rising unemployment which negatively influenced stock 
prices at the beginning of 1 9 7 0 » the second half of the 
year witnessed a rise in machinery share prices, espe­
cially domestic ones. Domestic E - Ps fell even faster 
than multinational ones.
Value Line predicted a general drop in earnings for 
I9 7 I' While this was true for some firms, the majority 
either remained stable or even increased their earnings. 
Good prospects in oil and water drilling equipment as 
well as in construction machinery prevented share price 
decreases. Both multinational and domestic E - Ps fell
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slightly during the year.
In 1 9 7 2 , while the demand for energy and construc­
tion equipment rose, capital spending by manufacturing 
companies was somewhat slower. E - Ps for both multi­
nationals and domestics remained stable.
During 1973» earnings rose substantially without a 
corresponding increase in prices mainly because of the 
fear of possible shortages in raw materials, particularly 
of basic metals in the U.S. The multinationals were less 
affected because the devaluation of the dollar made them 
more competitive abroad. While multinational E - Ps in­
creased moderately, domestic ones rose sharply.
Despite steady earnings, machinery share prices de­
clined very much probably because of the pessimism caused 
by the energy crisis and the economic recession in 1 9 7 .̂ 
During the year, the E - Ps of both multinationals and 
domestics grew very rapidly.
Although there were bleak prospects at the beginning 
of 1 9 7 5 » non-electrical machinery earnings grew at a I3  
percent annual rate during the last quarter of the year. 
Also, share prices went up considerably. The rise in 
E - Ps for both multinationals and domestics continued 
but at a far more moderate rate.
During I9 7 6 , despite good expectations, earnings did 
not grow as fast as anticipated. This caused an increase 
in share prices which was unwarranted by the earnings 
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tics declined but that of the latter did so more rapidly.
In 1 9 7 7 » prices went up but earnings, especially 
multinational ones, increased even faster. While both 
multinational and domestic E - Ps rose, the latter did 
so more mildly probably because of improvements in the 
U.S. market.
CHEMICAL AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 
Chemical shares were expected to perform better than 
the average of all shares during 1965* While net income 
and sales were expected to grow by 4 percent, dividends 
were anticipated to rise by 7 percent. Also, the new 
tax law was favourable to the industry. The increase in 
earnings was accompanied by an almost equal increase in 
prices. The E - Ps for both multinationals and domestics 
remained relatively stable.
In 1 9 6 6 , while short term prospects were good, there 
was a concern that the general business climate could 
deteriorate in the U.S. While the multinational E - Ps 
remained relatively stable during the year, domestic ones 
rose moderately.
The domestic earnings fell during I9 6 7 . However, 
this was not accompanied by a similar decrease in prices 
because investors believed this was temporary and saw 
better prospects for the longer term. While the E - Ps 
of the multinationals remained quite stable, those of the 
domestics fell moderately.
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The same situation basically continued in I9 6 8 . New 
facilities and expansions in the U.S. reduced domestic 
earnings in the short term but offered good long term 
prospects. Chemical sales were expected to grow at par 
with the American GNP during I9 6 8 . Multinational E - Ps 
declined very slightly while domestic ones fell consider­
ably.
The fact that the long awaited great increases in 
earnings did not come about, brought gloom to investors 
who became disenchanted with domestic chemical stocks in 
1 9 6 9 * The point should be made that chemical stocks, 
until late I9 6 6 , carried unrealistically low E - Ps, a 
hangover from an earlier era when the novelty of chemical 
technology allowed high growth records. By I9 6 9 » these 
previously "new" products had already become low profit- 
margin commodities. Yet, there was the general belief 
that there were still opportunities for new discoveries 
and hence new products in I9 6 9 . During the year, domes­
tic E - Ps rose quite rapidly while multinational ones 
remained rather stable most probably because of the bet­
ter opportunities overseas.
Earnings declines steepened by late I9 6 9  and early" 
1 9 7 0  mainly due to cutbacks in automobile production in 
the U.S. However, prices did not follow suit because in­
vestors thought there would be an upturn by the end of 
the year. While the multinational E - Ps remained rela­
tively stable, the domestic ones declined considerably.
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Although profits began to increase in 1971» this was 
not reflected in prices due to the hangover from the pre­
vious year. Overseas markets were turning more intensely 
competitive with lower growth rates and profits squeezes. 
While the domestic E - Ps rose slightly, the multination­
al ones remained stable.
Sharp earnings gains were expected for 1972. The 
revaluation of major currencies in 1971 against the dollar 
gave a competitive edge to U.S. producers in world mar­
kets. However, investors felt that this might be of 
short duration. While multinational E - Ps remained 
stable, the domestic ones rose moderately.
In 1973» the increase in share prices was not as 
high as that of earnings due to the overcaution of inves­
tors vis-k-vis chemical shares. Both multinational and 
domestic E - Ps rose rapidly during the year.
During 1974, chemical stock prices were negatively 
influenced by the Arab oil embargo despite the fact that 
earnings increased rapidly. Investors were more wary of 
domestic shares because of the misperception that the US. 
would be hardest hit from the 1974 recession. While 
multinational E - Ps rose rapidly, the domestic ones rose 
far more rapidly.
1975 was a year when recovery began. While the mul­
tinational E - Ps increased only slightly, the domestic 
ones declined moderately.






















expected GNP growth rates were respectively put at 5 and 
3 percent. Chemical firms were expected to do much bet­
ter than that and they did. Although earnings increased, 
prices increased even faster. While the multinational 
E - Ps declined rapidly, the domestic ones fell even more 
rapidly due in part to increased exports from the U.S.
During 1977» the fast increase in earnings slowed 
down and the weakening of many foreign currencies vis-à- 
vis the dollar influenced the multinationals negatively. 
While the multinational E - Ps rose slightly, the domes­
tic ones fell quite moderately.
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS
At the beginning of I9 6 5 » the two fabricated metal 
producing multinational firms in our sample were poorly 
rated by Value Line. During the year, however, prices 
did not fall as fast as earnings did and the multination­
al E - Ps actually fell. The domestic firms showed 
little change in any respect and their E - Ps remained 
stable.
As far as the U.S. domestic market was concerned, 
metal containers proved to be quite immune to the I9 6 6  
recession. However, the recession adversely affected 
construction activities and one of the multinationals was 
especially affected since it was heavily involved in fa­
bricated metal products used in construction. Thus,
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despite no apparent changes in foreign markets, the E - 
Ps of multinationals rose probably because of the lull 
in construction.
Both construction and packaging looked promising in 
1 9 6 7 . Moreover, the introduction of the new tin-free 
steel metal containers brightened the prospects for metal 
fabricators. E - Ps generally declined.
In 1 9 6 8 , packaging became very profitable. Earnings 
prospects were especially good in metal cans. There were 
no noteworthy changes in foreign markets. Multinational 
as well as domestic E - Ps continued their downward slide.
During I9 6 9 , prices did not rise as fast as the very 
rapidly rising earnings in metal containers. One of the 
multinationals had poor prospects in toiletries both in 
the U.S. and abroad. E - Ps of both multinationals and 
domestics rose but the former's rise was faster probably 
due to the problems encountered by that multinational.
While the I9 7 O prospects were lukewarm for toile­
tries, they seemed bright for other metal fabricating 
activities partly because of a construction recovery in 
the U.S. As both E - Ps fell, the domestic E - Ps fell 
even faster.
In 1 9 7 1 , metal packaging was understood to be a 
source of pollution. This increased popular reaction 
against it and tended to restrict its use in the U.S.. 
Construction did not do as well as was previously ex­
pected. The performance of toiletries, also, was mediocre
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in the U.S. While multinational E - Ps were stable, the 
domestic ones rose.
During 1972, toiletries did badly overseas, espe­
cially in Western Europe where economic conditions were 
sluggish. While construction was good in the first half 
of the year, it began to taper off during the second half. 
Although 1 9 7 2  was a difficult year for containers, more 
distant future prospects looked brighter. Yet, overall 
metal fabricating earnings increased. Multinational and 
domestic E - Ps rose in 1972.
The energy crisis of 1973 affected all aspects of 
metal fabricating. The construction activities in the 
U.S. and Canada were weak. One of the two multinationals 
did badly in general. Although the other one managed to 
increase its earnings, this did not seem to influence 
investors and its share price fell. In the end, the 
multinational E - Ps rose even faster than the domestic 
ones which also rose steeply.
In 1 9 7 4 , earnings prospects for metal fabricating 
industries took a turn for the worse. Higher raw mate­
rial costs abroad made it even worse for multinationals. 
Share prices fell very sharply and E - Ps for domestics 
and multinationals continued to rise fast.
In 1 9 7 5 » though there were general improvements both 
in the U.S. and abroad, it was the U.S. boom in housing 
and an upsurge in packaging activities which led the way. 
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multinational E - Ps as compared to domestic ones was 
mainly the result of foreign sales.
During 1976, both multinations had earnings declines 
far greater than their respective share price declines. 
Domestic firms did well especially in packaging and con­
struction. Multinational E - Ps declined faster than 
their domestic counterparts in 1 9 7 6 .
In 1 9 7 7 , there was a marked slowdown in U.S. con­
struction activities. Other conditions seemed to have 
relatively stabilized. Thus, domestic E - Ps rose sub­
stantially faster than the multinational ones.
NON-FERROUS METALS
During I9 6 5 , prospects for multinationals looked 
better not because of better foreign market conditions 
but because the two multinationals in our sample hea­
vily dealt with lead and zinc which had excellent earn­
ings records and prospects. The E - Ps of multinationals 
declined while those of the domestics rose.
As lead and zinc became somewhat less attractive 
during I9 6 6 , aluminum and copper, sold mainly by the do­
mestic firms in our sample, came to the limelight because 
of higher demand from the military, construction and 
packaging industries.
In 1 9 6 7 , the greater fall in multinational E - Ps 
could be partly attributed to the copper strike of U.S. 
producers. The multinationals in our sample were heavily
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involved with copper. Moreover, the earnings of multi­
nationals fell because of devaluations in Chile, Zambia, 
Peru and the Congo but shares did not follow suit. In 
the end, while domestic E - Ps declined moderately, 
multinational E - Ps fell sharply.
The copper strike ended in I9 6 8  but it resulted in 
an increase of 5 percent in copper prices. Inflation 
and declining reserves in the U.S. made gold more at­
tractive. One of the multinationals was heavily involved 
in lead and zinc which became attractive for investors. 
The multinational E - Ps fell faster than the domestic 
ones did in I9 6 8 .
During I9 6 9 , prospects for lead and zinc became 
dimmer while those of copper greatly improved. Gold was 
losing its attractiveness. Although the earnings of 
aluminum increased, fears of recession in the U.S. led 
to a fall in the corresponding share prices. The multi­
national E - Ps rose even faster than the domestic ones.
Despite a dim beginning, 19?0 proved to be a good 
year for metals in general. A resurgence in the U.S. and 
world economies was expected. Metal share prices went 
up and the E - Ps of both multinationals and domestics 
went down.
During 1971, lead and zinc had better prospects than 
other metals and the share price of one of the multi­
nationals, dealing with these metals, rose. A countering 
but lesser influence was the appreciation of European and
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Japanese currencies in relation to the U.S. dollar. Dur­
ing the year, while multinational E - Ps remained stable, 
the domestic E - Ps rose.
In 1 9 7 2 , the earnings of domestic companies which 
dealt with gold rose but without a corresponding increase 
in share prices because of uncertainties in the U.S. eco­
nomy. The domestic E - Ps rose substantially faster than 
the multinational ones.
1 9 7 3  was a year of major upheavals and uncertainties 
arising from the war in the Middle East and the energy 
crisis. Like others, the prices of the majority of metal 
shares dropped sharply. Those metals which did well were 
gold and silver as well as lead which seemed to have good 
prospects as an additive to gasoline, thus increasing 
fuel efficiency. Lead could also be used in battery pro­
duction. The E - Ps of domestics rose somewhat faster 
than those of multinationals during the year. In any 
case, both rose very rapidly.
An examination of the two multinationals in our sam­
ple shows that their earnings rose tremendously during 
1 9 7 4 , However, there were no reflections of this on 
share prices because of uncertainties primarily in the 
rest of the world and secondarily in the U.S. The do­
mestics underwent the same phenomenon, though somewhat 
more moderately. The E - Ps continued their rapid rise 
in 1 9 7 4  with the multinational E - Ps rising even faster 
than those of the abroad domestic firms which were able
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During 1975» the slowdown in the increase of earn­
ings was not accompanied by a drop in share prices. Pro­
spects were moderate in general but were better for lead 
and zinc. Both multinational and domestic E - Ps rose 
but the latter rose faster. This was probably because of 
investors' perception that the worse was over in world 
uncertainties.
In 1 9 7 6 , while prices went up, earnings fell. Of 
the metals, lead did extremely well, especially in the 
second half of the year. P^îultinational and domestic E - 
Ps both fell rapidly. The former declined even more 
drastically.
While prospects for aluminum looked dim, they were 
better for gold and copper at the beginning of 1977* At 
the end of the year, however, there was a complete re­
versal of the situation and this influenced the multi­
nationals negatively. While domestic E - Ps fell, multi­
national ones rose.
FOOD PRODUCTS
Despite increasing competition both in the U.S. and 
abroafd, some of the food companies in our sample intro­
duced new products in the domestic market in 1965» Still, 
the expected increase in sales and net income for the 
food companies was better than the average of all com­
panies. During I9 6 5 , the multinational E - Ps rose
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moderately while the domestic ones remained stable.
In 1 9 6 6 , food companies were squeezed between higher 
ingredient costs, resulting from higher food demand, and 
attempts at keeping price hikes at a minimum. Thus,
there was a heavy pressure on profit margins. However,
a high demand for food products prevented substantial de­
clines in share prices. During the year, both domestic 
and multinational E - Ps rose only slightly.
Investors' perception of food as having a relatively
inelastic demand in the long-run as well as increasing 
product prices countered the slight fall in demand at the 
end of 1 9 6 7  and the beginning of I9 6 8 . The three multi­
nationals, in our sample, were traditionally more unwill­
ing to boost prices and were thus more prone to price- 
cost squeezes. During I9 6 7 , while the domestic E - Ps 
fell slightly, the multinational ones rose moderately.
1 9 6 8  was a mixed year. At the beginning, there was 
a price-cost squeeze which reduced the earnings. Later 
in the year, however, a redressment of earnings took 
place and an increase in earnings of at least 7 percent 
was expected for I9 6 9 . The three multinationals, in our 
sample, finally increased their product prices after a 
time lag. Also, their foreign operations were very pro­
fitable. While both domestic and multinational E - Ps 
fell, the latter did so faster.
In 1 9 6 9 , the earnings of the multinationals in­
creased faster than their stock prices, thus resulting in
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an increase for E - Ps which was moderate probably because 
of the counter effect of high demand for food. The domes­
tic E - Ps remained stable.
During I9 7 O, the multinationals in our sample per­
formed very well both in the U.S. and abroad. Their 
stock prices increased even faster than the earnings 
thus leading to lower multinational E - Ps. The domestic 
E - Ps remained stable during the year.
Because of the relative immunity of food demand to 
an economic slump, food shares did better than others 
during 1971* However, investors who expected a recovery 
in the U.S. economy were more tempted by the undervalued 
shares in other industries. During 1971, the E - Ps of 
both multinationals and domestics rose moderately.
In 1 9 7 2 , because of the increasing trend and demand 
for ready food outside the U.S., foreign earnings of 
multinationals continued their upward trend. However, 
these increased earnings had little reflection on multi­
national share prices because investors continued to be 
interested in the undervalued stocks of other industries. 
During the year, the multinational E - Ps rose faster 
than the domestic ones.
In 1 9 7 3 » price regulations in the U.S. influenced 
the domestics more than the multinationals. Stock price 
declines were greater for the domestics, even though earn­



















During 19?4, domestic food demand did not fall de­
spite the recession. However, the continuing price freeze 
discouraged investments in domestic food shares. Multi­
nationals were more immune to the freeze. In 197^, do­
mestic E - Ps rose faster than multinational ones.
In 1 9 7 5 » while demand persisted, ingredients prices, 
in the U.S., plummeted, interest rates came down and 
packaging costs levelled off. There was a considerable 
increase in sales and profits in the domestic market. 
Foreign markets were not so active. During the year, do­
mestic E - Ps fell while multinational ones remained 
stable.
During 1976, further declines in costs, especially 
ingredient prices, in the U.S. made domestic food shares 
very attractive to investors. Despite increasing earn­
ings, prices rose even faster. While multinational E - Ps 
were stable, domestic ones fell considerably.
In 1 9 7 7 . good trends continued for food but with the 
U.S. economy pulling out of recession, investors began to 
look at undervalued shares of other industries. Foreign 
food prospects looked even better. While the multi­
national E - Ps fell, the domestic E - Ps rose because 
investors did not respond to earnings increases.
After having examined the events which may possibly 
have influenced the earnings - price ratios, it would now 
be appropriate to take note of some noteworthy results.
We can see that the earnings - price ratios are
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influenced not only by multinationality versus domesti­
city per se but also by other factors like demand for 
various products within a certain industry group, the 
performance of a single company when the sample is small, 
government interventions like price fixings and tariffs, 
shortages or gluts of raw materials, exchange rates, the 
marketing of new products in the U.S. and their possible 
eventual adoptions abroad, the level of worldwide com­
petition for various products and finally the location of 
raw materials. The last factor explains, to an important 
degree, why petroleum refining and food products run con­
trary to our hypothesis. If the multinationals are hea­
vily dependent on raw material located outside the U.S., 
they will be more subject to pressures by host countries 
and less indispensable since they have less leverage than 
other industries which depend far more on high-techno^ 
logy. As for fabricated metals, the erratic performance 
of one of the two multinationals seems to influence the 
results significantly. This firm is rather heavily in­
volved in toiletries which have not been doing so well 
during a major part of the period under study. Of these 
two factors, the location of raw materials outside the 
U.S. is one which has a long-term, if not lasting, influ­
ence on the comparative risk of multinationals and domes­
tics. All the other factors can work both ways at one 
time or another and thus, in conformity with the law of 
large numbers, they would tend to cancel one another. In
- 211 -
fact, this is a major reason for our taking a relatively 
long period of time and several industries, each with a 
number of firms.
The same law of large numbers helps us to find 
rather related results in the long-term for the cost of 
equity capital (k^) and earnings - price ratios (E - Ps). 
The same is not true for the short-term because there 
simply are not enough years to make the law of large num­
bers work for us. Again, this shows the additional labour 
involved in studying a long-term period was worth it.
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CHAPTER 8
FORWARD-LOOKING AND HISTORICAL GROWTH RATES
While the main purpose of this study is to explore 
the relative changes in multinational and domestic costs 
of equity capital, the data also lends itself to making 
some useful comments about the controversy over the use 
of forward-looking estimates of growth versus estimates 
based on historical data when incorporating a growth ele­
ment into the cost of equity capital calculations.
Researchers agree that one of the most, if not the 
most, difficult problems encountered in calculating the 
cost of equity capital is the derivation of a good esti­
mate of the growth rate. In the past, most analysts have 
used historical holding period return spreads for their 
calculations. R.G. Ibbotson and R.A. Sinquefield (1 9 7 6 a 
and 1 9 7 6 b), in a series of studies, presented year-by­
year historical rates of return for different asset 
classes and showed how to use the historical data in sim­
ulating future return distributions.
If a company has experienced a relatively steady 
growth in earnings and dividends, and if this rate of 
growth is expected to continue in the future, then, past 
growth rate might be used for projecting future growth. 
However, there are certain problems with historical rates 
involving methods of calculation, holding periods, and 
conceptual matters.
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First, according to Fisher and Lorie (I9 6 6 1 I6 2 -I6 9 )i 
alternative ways of calculating procedures cause sub­
stantial differences in reported rates of return on port­
folios. The choice of stocks included in the stock port­
folio, determination of different weights to each securi­
ty and if necessary, handling taxes, brokerage commis-, 
sions, capital gains taxes, etc. can exert a substantial 
influence on estimating the cost of equity capital.
The length of the holding period used in calcula­
tions can result in a great difference in the final out­
come. Short holding periods will cause very volatile re­
turns. The calculated rate of return on common stocks 
(before personal taxes) ranged from 8.1# to I3 .4# even 
with holding periods ranging 25 to 50 years (Brigham and 
Shome, I9 7 9 ). Also, the choice of an ending point would 
have a tremendous effect on the calculated returns if, 
during a year, the stock market closed very strongly or 
very weakly.
There is also a conceptual weakness in using past 
data to estimate returns on equity. It is generally 
accepted that investors are interested in the anticipated 
returns of a portfolio, not the realized (past) returns.
If market earnings expectations are rational, then 
they should be measured by the best available return 
forecasts. Brown and Rozeff (1978), under the rational 
expectations hypothesis, tested the widely used forward- 
looking Value Line Investment Survev forecasts against
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historical studies, using nonparametric statistics. They 
concluded that direct measures of earnings expectations, 
such as security analysts' forecasts, were superior to 
time series forecasts which neglect potentially useful 
information. Sharpe (l9?8i343-3^5) also indicates that 
the Value Line Investment Survey ranking of expected stock 
performance "beats the market" by about 10 percent a year. 
Each week, every one of about 1600 stocks is assigned one 
of five ranks (highest to lowest). While the top-ranked 
stocks "beat the market" by about 10 percent per year the 
bottom ranked ones were "beaten by the market" by 10 per­
cent.
Generally, the ex post realized return is quite dif­
ferent from the ex ante expected return. It is sometimes 
argued that investors, over a long period, actually earn 
returns that are equal to their required returns (Brigham 
and Shome, 1979:12-13). Supposedly, if investors are dis­
appointed by low returns over some period, then the secu­
rity prices will decrease to the point where returns in 
subsequent periods will pull the average realized return 
back up to the expected level. There is no evidence 
supporting this argument.
Some analysts argue that investors, when making 
capital budgeting, have a good idea of expected and re­
quired returns, and use this knowledge when setting the 
rates. If a reasonable degree of proficiency is assumed 
in the capital budgeting process, then, ex post returns
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will turn out to be close to ex ante returns. However, 
this proposition assumes that companies already know, 
with a fair degree of precision, the cost of equity capi­
tal.
These problems, together with other economic pro­
blems, like inflation, make the estimation of returns 
based on historical data highly questionable. Analysts 
have argued that it is not generally satisfactory to use 
solely past trends for purposes of estimating the cost of 
capital, and have developed other methods for making 
growth forecasts.
Brigham and Shome (1979:21-27) used one of the widely 
employed procedures for forecasting long-term future 
growth rates in their study of estimating a market risk 
premium. Their method involves multiplying the fraction 
of a company's earnings which investors expect to retain 
(b) by the expected rate of return on book equity (ROE):
g = b X ROE
In order to get exactly correct estimates of future 
growth, the percentage of earnings retained, and the ex­
pected future rate of return on book equity should be 
measured accurately and stay constant over time. Further­
more, the company is assumed to sell no new common stock, 
or to sell it at book value. Brigham and Shome argue ' 
that these three conditions sre expected to hold true 
into the indefinite future, and that the formula gives a 
reasonably accurate estimate of long-term growth. One of
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their propositions is that most of the companies have 
reasonably stable target payout ratios over time, so 
their target retention rates (b) are reasonably stable. 
Variations in retention rates will be around the target 
values. Therefore, they take an average of retention 
rates in the recent past to estimate b. They examine two 
alternative methods for estimating growth rates.
In their first method which assumes that investors 
give a greater weight to more recent data than to earlier 
data, they calculate b and ROE as the weighted averages 
of the expected retention rates and returns on book equi­
ty in the market. In the second method, they assume that 
investors expect retention rates, as a matter of corporate 
policy, either to be stable or fluctuating around a target 
level. Then, they calculate the expected retention rate 
for the market as the ratio of total earnings retained to 
total earnings available over the preceeding five years. 
For the market ROE, they use the notion that dividends 
are paid out of "normalized" earnings. Hence dividends 
can be used to estimate normalized ROE.* They determine
* The normalized rate of return on average book equity 
is defined as*
Normalized ROEi — Expected Earnings
Expected Book Value
— Expected Dividends ^
Expected Payout Rate Expected Book Value
_________ Current Dividends (1 t g ) _______
(Expected Payout) (Current Book Value) (1 + g)
______________ Current Dividends_________
(1-Expected Retention Rate) (Current Book Value)
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the normalized rate of return on book equity for the mar­
ket from the normalized data of individual companies.
Although, their most critical assumptions about the 
constant growth Gordon model, retention rate and returns 
on book equity over the last four or five years, seem 
reasonable, they maintain the impossibility of ascertain­
ing the "true" aggregate expected growth rate.
In an earlier study, Malkiel (1979) based his growth 
rate on Value Line earnings growth forecasts. Further, 
he assumed that all growth rates are expected to decline 
exponentially to the long-term national growth rate (cur­
rently 3 .6 #), after the initial ^-year period. Using the 
Gordon model to estimate the expected rate of return on 
the 3 0  Dow Jones Industrial stocks each year from i9 6 0  
to 1 9 7 7 , he performed a number of calculations with dif­
ferent horizon periods before the growth rate fell to its 
"permanent" level. The results of these calculations 
were remarkably robust and the estimated risk premiums 
are very similar to those of the infinite horizon model.
In this stddy, the cost of equity capital is cal­
culated in two ways, using historical and forward-looking 
growth rates from Value Line Investment Survey.
In order to make the comparison more meaningful, we 
use a cost of equity capital with historical growth dif­
ferent from that of the Kohers method which was explained 
in Chapter 3* The present method uses the same Value 
Line dividend yield (d/P) as that used in our cost of
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equity capital calculations with forward-looking growth.
It will be remembered that we calculated a different 
(quarterly) dividend yield for the Kohers method. The 
historical growth rates in the present method were taken 
from value Line which took the average growth rate for 
each five-year period immediately preceeding the year for 
which the cost of equity capital was calculated. For in­
stance, the Value Line of I9 6 5  indicates what the average 
growth rates has been for 1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 5 * Likewise, one can 
look at the Value Line of 19?4 to find the average growth 
rate for I9 6 9 -I9 7 4 . Thus, it is assumed that the average 
growth for the past five years will continue in the fu­
ture .
As already mentioned. Brown and Rozeff (I9 7 8 ) and 
Sharpe (I9 7 8 ) show that Value Line data are used by a 
great number of investors and the predictions are proven 
to be superior to some other models (like the Box and 
Jenkins Time Series Forecasting which is accepted as being 
a relatively sophisticated time series model). One of the 
test results attributes Value Line * s superiority to its 
use of the information set available to it on the quarter­
ly earnings announcement date, and not to the acquisition 
of information arising after the quarterly esimings an­
nouncement date. Early acquisition of this incremental 
information has a positive effect on predicting the next 
quarter * s earnings.
The results of these two methods with growth rates
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based on historical and forward-looking data are shown 
in Figure 8-1 and Figure 8-2.
Two significant differences can be observed right 
away. First, for the same years, k^ based on past data 
shows greater fluctuations than k^ based on anticipated 
data. This is probably the result of security analysts* 
assessments of the erratic periods. That is to say, k^ 
based on anticipated data could reflect analysts' correc­
tive judgements for the abnormal deviations, while k^ bas­
ed on past data would carry the abnormal deviations over.
The second noticeable difference is that k^ based on 
past data follows k^ based on anticipated data with a one 
year lag in many cases. One could perhaps say that the 
anticipations of analysts might grasp the effects of var­
ious factors which influence the market earlier than these 
factors show their effect on the market. Therefore, k^ 
based on past data might lag behind k^ based on antici­
pated data as past data might reflect that information 
only after a certain time.
When we compare our results with those of Brigham 
and Shome, we see that our multinational and domestic 
data follow those of Brigham and Shome quite well but 
at a somewhat higher level. The difference is probably 
the result of the different samples used in the studies. 
The cash-flow earnings growth, which is used in our cal­
culations, may also have contributed to this difference.
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higher than growth based on the expected rate of return 
on book equity which is used by Brigham and Shome.
For a comparison we show the cost of equity capital 
calculated by Brigham and Shome (1979*31) together with 
our forward-looking multinational k^ and domestic k^ on 
Figures 8-3 and 8-4.
An interest situation emerges from the comparison 
of our forward-looking k^s with our historical k^s and 
with the kgS of Brigham and Shome. Despite the use of 
a different sample, our k^'s with forward-looking growth 
rates follow the Brigham and Shome k^'s more closely then 
they do our k^'s with historical growth rates. This 
shows that growth rates can have an important effect on 
the cost of equity capital. In this case, the difference 
of growth rates was more important than the difference of 
samples.
The results of our calculations seem to follow the 
economic events of the period relatively well. As ex­
plained in the Appendix, the inflationary bout beginning 
with the American military intervention in Vietnam in 
1 9 6 5 , had pulled the stock prices down contrary to the 
previous inflationary rounds. According to Sobel (1975* 
288), the Dow Jones Industrial Average was at 874.13 at 
the end of 1964. As inflation began to accelerate, stock 
prices began to fall. As a result, the cost of equity 
capital increased as seen in the figures of the previous 
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mum at the end of I9 6 6 , in our figures reached a peak. 
Although the sluggish economic conditions persisted in 
the beginning of I9 6 7 » the monetary authorities* more 
expansionary policy made the interest rates decrease. 
Business fixed investment kept increasing, and stock 
prices picked up some gains at the end of the year. While 
slow economic expansion continued in I9 6 8 , Sobel (1975* 
3 2 0 ) writes that the Dow Jones rose above the 950 mark 
and reached its peak in December when our k^ went down. 
After this peak, stock prices began to fall until the 
middle of I9 7 0 , apparently affecting k^ reversely.
In the second half of I970, stock prices recovered 
and, in December, the Dow Jones exceeded the 800 mark. 
Total GNP which had fallen 0.4 percent in 1970, began to 
rise slowly and its growth rate was calculated as 2 .7  
percent for the whole of 1971 (EIU-QER-USA, 1972a). There 
was a corresponding decrease in our k^ figures. Infla­
tionary forces remained strong during the year. In Au­
gust 1971, the president announced a 90-day wage and price 
controls to curb inflation. Although stock prices con­
tinued to increase and corporate profits recovered, the 
high inflation rate and large relative price changes 
created uncertainties for long-run future planning. Prob­
ably, businessmen's fear of price controls that would 
impinge on corporate profitability was the cause of the 
kg increases in I972 in the figures.
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Rising interest rates were accompanied by substan­
tial inflation in 1973* In October, the Arab Oil boycott 
worsened the situation. Although corporate profits con­
tinued to be good in 1973i several speculative shares 
lost value and that increased the worries about the over­
all economy (Sobel, 1975*363). In 1974, impeachment de­
bates and Nixon's resignation added to the uncertainties 
and the economy began to decline. By early 1975» it was 
believed that the economy had entered its worse recession 
since the 1930s. All these events showed their reflec­
tions on stock prices. The Dow Jones fell in 1973 and 
1974 sharply. In our figures, kg continued to increase 
during these periods.
At the beginning of 1975» the gloomy outlook of the 
economy continued to prevail. Real decrease in the GNP, 
during the first quarter of 1975» was 11.3 percent. In­
dustrial production was down 12.4 percent in April com­
pared to the same period of the previous year whereas 
consumer prices were up 10.2 percent (EIU-QER-USA, 1975b), 
The economy started to recover in the second half of 1975 
The real GNP growth reached a I3 .2 percent annual rate in 
the third quarter, due to the rapid increase in spending 
on cars (EIU-QER-USA, 1975c). The fall in some food 
prices brought about a moderation to the increase of 
wholesale prices. While the stock market was recovering, 
expectations were higher for 1976. The cost of equity 
capital continued to increase, though at a lower rate, in
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1975' The rate of increase was even lower for the domes­
tic firms.
The recovery which started in the second half of 
1975 went on to the last quarter of 1976. Industrial 
production was growing while profits and share prices 
continued to go up steadily. The Dow Jones Industrial 
Average was 947.92 for the year (Economic Indicators, 
1979*31)' As a result, there was a decrease in kg as 
shown in the figures.
During the first quarter of 1977» pessimism about 
inflation and fear of price controls were dominating Wall 
Street. Although GNP was expected to rise by 5 percent, 
stockholding was reduced because of policy uncertainties. 
Wholesale prices and interest rates were increasing in 
the second half of 1977' The Dow Jones Industrial Ave­
rage fell down to 8 9 4 .6 3 » and continued down in I9 7 8  
(Economic Indicators, 1979*31)« The cost of equity capi­
tal started to rise again in I9 7 6  and 1 9 7 7 '
This chapter has shown that the type of growth rate 
used in calculating the cost of equity capital is quite 
important. We have found that forward-looking (ex ante) 
growth rates yield results which are very different from 
those given by historical (ex cost) growth rates. Just 
as Malkiel and Brigham and Shome have done before, we 
have argued that forward-looking growth rates reflect 
investors' attitudes better than historical ones do.
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CHAPTER 9
THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
GENERAL BACKGROUND
The purpose of explaining the field of inter­
national business and its evolution is to see what 
the existing theories are, whether they help to ex­
plain our findings and whether our findings corro­
borate or disprove them entirely or partially.
International business used to be thought synony­
mous with international trade, the importing and ex­
porting of goods among nations of the world. However, 
with the proliferation of direct investment, this 
narrow definition of international business (manage­
ment) did not suffice anymore. Before going straight 
into theories dealing with the direct investments of 
multinational firms, it would be appropriate to mention 
briefly a paradigmic theory of comparative advantage 
which has been a stimulator of later theories.
The theory of comparative advantage as expounded 
by Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and other followers of 
Adam Smith can be expressed in the following manner 
(Vernon, I971il07)s
1. Whether or not one of two regions is 
absolutely more efficient in the production 
of every good than is the other, if each 
specializes in the products in which it has 
a comparative advantage (greatest relative efficiency), trade will be mutually pro­
fitable to both regions. Real wages of 
productive factors will rise in both places.
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2. An ill-designed prohibitive tariff, far 
from helping the protected factor of pro­
duction, will instead reduce its real wage 
by making imports expensive and by making 
the whole world less productive through 
eliminating the efficiency inherent in the 
best pattern of specialization and division 
of labor.
Ricardo measured all costs in terms of labour, 
Modern day economists like Ohlih propound that the 
theory is still valid even if a labour theory of value 
is not assumed. Again, Ohlin stated that free move­
ments of labour and capital between countries would tend 
to equalize wages and factor prices (Vernon, I97I1666).
First of all, this idea of Ricardo is firmly 
based upon the "laissez faire, laisser passer" doctrine 
of Adam Smith of whom he is a follower. The law of 
comparative advantage clearly assumes a liberal free 
economy with minimum government interference.
The general theory of international capital flows 
deals with movements of capital from one country to 
another in response to differences in the marginal 
productivitiy of capital. This means that capital will 
go to places where the rate of return or yield is high­
er, assuming the risk is the same. However, this 
theory has been unable to explain a great part of the 
sizable flows of direct investment capital in recent 
years. For instance, American firms are making large 
direct investments in Europe while European firms are 
simultaneously making sizable direct investments in 
America. In addition to that, direct overseas invest-
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merits do not necessarily involve capital transfers 
from one country to another since the investing 
firms may simply borrow funds in the host country. 
Hence, new explanations for the reasons motivating 
multinational firms to invest abroad are needed.
The micro-theory of the firm has later been inte­
grated with the macro-theory of international capital 
movements and this has produced a series of theories 
like the "defensive investment" concept of Lamfa- 
lussy (1961) which states that direct investment is 
undertaken where there are large and growing markets 
in view of long-term rather than short-term profit­
ability. Our empirical test yields results that seem 
to support partially Lamfalussy's concept in our sam­
ple. Thus, the average cost of equity capital of all 
multinationals declines in relation to that of the 
domestics. This shows that these initially "unat­
tractive looking" investments were made in anticipa­
tion of better performance in the future. Another 
example is Aliber's theory which explains overseas 
direct investment as a currency phenomenon brought 
about by the market's preference for holding assets 
denominated in selected currencies which are, of 
course, strong currencies (Aliber, 1970*34). Both 
these theories remain unsatisfactory in explaining 
the reasons for direct investment. In fact, the 
development of a theoretical framework for explain­
ing international business patterns has been outrun
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by the practice of international business. The new 
and more complex patterns of international business 
cannot be satisfactorily explained by traditional 
economic theories of international trade and invest­
ment.
However, new approaches inspired by the facts 
of international business, are beginning to provide 
a theoretical framework. The main ones are:
a) The oligopoly model
b) The product cycle model
c) The international transmission of resources
d) The portfolio theory
The above theories combine the business and eco­
nomics approach. We can thus see what the main models 
are, in what respects they are adequate or inadequate, 
how each of them fits into the whole field, eind how 
they are evolving.




According to this model, the firm makes foreign 
direct investments to benefit from a certain quasi 
monopoly advantage it has. The advantage of the 
multinational firm over local firms may be due to:
a) Technology
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b) Access to capital
c) Differentiated products built on advertising
d) Better management
e) Economies of scale
A cost-benefit analysis must indicate whether 
that special advantage overweighs the disadvantage of 
operating in a foreign environment. According to 
Caves (1 9 6 9 *5 )» a cost-benefit analysis must also 
be made to determine whether this advantage is import­
ant enough to more than offset other ways of exploit­
ing rent such as licensing or exporting. This comes 
close to Lamfalussy's "defensive investment" concept 
explained before.
The oligopoly model not only explains "horizontal 
investments" for foreign production of goods and serv­
ices similar to those products in the domestic market 
but also explains "vertical investments" to produce 
overseas a raw or intermediary input for the domestic 
production process. This latter investment may raise 
barriers to the entry of a new competitor and protect 
their oligopoly position.
Although the oligopoly model combines to a cer­
tain extent the fields of economics and business 
management, it still cannot answer some important 
phenomena. For instance, why did firms not take ad­
vantage of their quasi-monopoly positions to such an 
extent before? Moreover, this model can explain 
continued rapid expansion in foreign investment only
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to the extent that the special advantages of the in­
vesting firms are expanding (Cooper, 1 9 6 8 :8 9 ). An­
other limitation of the theory is that it is not 
integrated with alternative ways such as exports or 
licensing. Also, it does not sufficiently explain 
acquisitions and mergers (Aliber, 1970:20).
After this succinct explanation of the theory, 
it would be appropriate to show how it relates to our 
findings. It must be stressed that the above mention­
ed five advantages of the multinational firms are over 
local firms in host countries and not necessarily over 
U.S. domestic firms. So, this aspect has only limited 
relevance as far as our study is concerned. At best, 
it can give a partial explanation of why the firms in 
our sample have gone multinational. The same can be 
said for the "horizontal investments" and "vertical 
investments". On the other hand, the findings of our 
study can explain a substantial part of what was left 
unexplained by the oligopoly model, namely, the rea­
son for the continued rapid expansion of multinationals 
during the last decade or two. The maturing of both 
the host countries and the multinational firms as well 
as the improvement of communications, as shown before, 
are new dimensions which further clarify the process 
of multinationalization. If the scope of the oligo­
poly model were sufficiently widened to incorporate 
our findings, the new synthesis could certainly be 
more functional than as it is.
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The product cycle theory
According to the product cycle theory, direct 
foreign investment is a natural stage in the life 
cycle of a new product from its birth to its maturity 
and eventual decline. This model which has signifi­
cantly contributed to a better understanding of the 
evolution of multinational firms is associated with 
the work of Raymond Vernon (I9 6 6 ). Accordingly, large 
firms have a technological advantage due to their ca­
pacity to carry our intensive and costly research and 
development activities. As a result, they discover 
technologically advanced, or at least differentiable, 
products. These products are introduced in the home 
country markets and, after a certain time, are exported. 
As the new products reach maturity, competition from 
quite similar products decreases the profit margins.
At this stage, manufacturing locations abroad are used 
in order to lower production costs and thereby to be 
able to compete in the host country and possibly other 
country markets. We must, however, mention the point 
that after the new product stage, there are two stages: 
the mature product stage and the standardized product 
stage. In the mature product stage, as technology 
becomes sufficiently routine to be transferred to a 
firm's firm export chances decrease, and as foreign 
demand increases to the point that it is worthwhile to 
establish a production facility of economic size, the 
enterprise is induced to produce abroad, generally in
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other developed countries. Then, in the standardized 
product stage, production may shift to low-cost lo­
cations in the less developed countries from which 
goods may be exported back to the home country and 
other markets.
The product cycle model has been able to explain 
the past performance of certain multinational manu­
facturing firms. Also, several empirical studies have 
supported this theory by showing a correlation between 
industries (and companies) with intensive research and 
development activities and direct foreign investment 
(Gruber, Mehta and Vernon, I9 6 7  and Baldwin, 1971).
Our selection of a sample of multinational cor­
porations and domestic corporations from the Fortune 
list of the 5 0 0  largest corporations in the United 
States partially supports Vernon's theory. Whereas 
Kohers (1 9 7 1 *6 5 -6 6 ) identified 55 U.S. multinational 
and 6 5  U.S. domestic corporations for his sample, we 
found only 28 multinationals for 28 domestics during 
the 1 9 6 5 - 1 9 7 8  period. The decrease in the number of 
eligible firms was a result of the increasing multi­
nationalization of U.S. firms. Thus, many of the 
firms which were domestics in I9 6 5 , became multi­
nationals during the 1970s. Another relevant aspect 
of the results of our study deals with the trends of 
petroleum and food products. The former and to a 
lesser extent the latter are dependent on scarce 
raw materials needed by the parent firm in the U.S.
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Petroleum products run contrary to our hypothesis 
according to the trend test for earnings - price 
ratios while the same phenomenon is true for food 
products when dealing with the cost of equity capital. 
As we had previously mentioned, the rest of the groups 
are primarily supporting our hypothesis or, to a 
lesser degree, are insignificant. Thus, those groups 
which have technologically more advanced products seem 
to support the product cycle theory, since the earnings 
- price ratio and cost of equity capital trends for 
multinationals are declining in relation to domestics. 
This apparent reduction in risk is apparently due to 
the need which host countries feel for the technologi­
cally advanced product. This is not valid for techno­
logically less sophisticated and/or raw material ori­
ented industry groups.
The product cycle theory does not really explain 
foreign investments in scarce raw materials needed by 
the parent firm in the home country, i.e. in mining, 
oil, and plantation operations. Vernon himself says 
that the theory does not apply to firms which have 
gone international for a long time and acquired a 
"global habit of mind" (Vernon, 1971*107). Moreover, 
the model does not emphasize enough location economics. 
If there is enough demand for the product and if the 
transportation costs are reduced sufficiently, it would 
pay to make direct investment abroad. The establish­
ment of automotive industries in several developing
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by multinational corporations attest to this idea. 
Savings in import tariffs should also be taken into 
account wherever applicable.
The product cycle model associated with Vernon 
has been expanded by a number of persons like L.T. 
Wells, R.B. Stobaugh, H.G. Johnson, W. Gruber, D.
Mehta, R.E. Baldwin and by Vernon himself through his 
later writings. Our findings, and possibly others to 
come, indicate that the product cycle theory gives 
only partial explanations and needs to widen its scope. 
The international transmission of resources theory
This model of Fayerweather (1969*15-50) is es­
sentially an extension of classical trade theory. It 
proposes that the multinational firm plays an important 
role in the transmission of resources like technologi­
cal, managerial and entrepreneurial skills, as well as 
the usual natural resources, capital and labour. 
Differentials in the supply-demand relationships of 
resources among countries generate basic economic pres­
sures for the international flow of resources and 
create opportunities for the multinational firm. The 
intervention of the nation states may reshape these 
resource-differential relationships which are essen­
tially determined by free economic forces into the 
actual patterns of opportunities open to the firm.
The firm makes use of these opportunities according 
to its strategy and characteristics.
It can easily be seen that Fayerweather*s theory
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combines classical trade and investment theory with 
the behavioural models of the business enterprise.
The theory distinguishes the resource transmission 
role of the multinational firm from that of the pure­
ly domestic firm in the following manner*
a) The multinational firm which has developed a 
global horizon looks at resource differentials among 
countries.
b) The multinational firm also takes into account 
the interventions of the nation-states.
Although this model makes a significant contri­
bution to explaining most of the dimensions of inter­
national business, it still does not explain the pro­
cess whereby firms acquire their global perspectives 
in the beginning. Moreover, it does not try to ex­
amine the evolutionary history of multinational firms.
As far as our findings are concerned, the transmission 
of resources model explains, at least to a degree, why 
petroleum products and food products do not yield the 
same results as the other groups do. As we have al­
ready mentioned, these two groups are more raw materials 
(natural resources) oriented than the others which are 
essentially technologically oriented. Thus, the former 
have to deal with host countries which are in a position 
of strength because they possess the scarce raw mate­
rials. Thus, the multinationals operating under such 
circumstances may look less secure because of real or 
imagined reasons. On the other hand, the multinationals
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belonging to the other industry groups seem to be in a 
stronger position because the host countries need their 
advanced technological skills (resources). Thus, the 
model can give a partial explanation as to why multina­
tionals, compared to domestics, can become riskier, while 
the opposite is true for the other groups. Although the 
international transmission of resources theory makes an 
attempt to introduce behavioural explanations, it does 
not explain a process whereby both the multinationals 
and the host countries can adapt to changing environments 
and different conditions by a learning or cognitive pro­
cess. If our findings about the maturing of multination­
als and host countries were integrated with this model, 
its comprehension and explanatory power would certainly 
increase.
Portfolio theory
Levy and Samat (I9 7 0 ) explained that an investor 
could decrease fluctuations arising from risky invest­
ments by holding an internationally diversified port­
folio of securities as compared with a domestically di­
versified portfolio.
The riskiness of an operation can be defined in 
terms of the likely variability of future returns from 
the operation (Weston and Brighan, 1975*309)- The 
overall risk can be reduced if there is an efficient 
diversification of investments. In other words, the 
correlation between or among the investments must be 
as close to a perfectly negative correlation as possible 
or vice-versa as far from a perfectly positive corre­
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lation as possible. This idea was formally formulated 
by Markowitz and then extended by Sharpe.
The same idea could be applied to an internation­
ally diversified portfolio of securities or direct fo­
reign investments. The Levy-Sarnat model assumes that 
rates of return on investments are less correlated 
among countries than they are in any one country. As 
long as expected rates of return are not perfectly 
correlated, it is possible to find a portfolio of in­
vestments that minimizes risk for a given rate of re­
turn. This suggests that multinational firms should 
sometimes prefer investments with lower returns if the 
correlation between these returns and the returns from 
the actual operations are negatively enough correlated.
The Levy-Sarnat model does explain a part of our 
findings. When we compare the betas (of the capital 
asset pricing model) of the multinational and domestic 
firms, we see that, the systematic risk of the multi­
nationals increased in relation to the domestics after 
1973, when the economic cycles of the United States and 
other industrialized countries were almost in unison. 
Thus, there was virtually no room left for internation­
al diversification. This aspect has been explained in 
greater detail in previous chapters.
We have seen how the Ricardian comparative ad­
vantage theory has paved the way for later theories in 
international economics and business. Weston (I9 6 6 : 
3 1 -3 5 ) draws a parallel between classical absolut-
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1st (Newtonian) physics and classical economics together 
with a parallel between relativistic (Einsteinian) 
physics and the behavioural theory of the firm. In 
line with the general tendency, we can clearly see a 
trend towards more relativism or behaviourism in the 
theories of international business. However, there 
still is a long way to cover before we have theories 
that give more complete explanations of international 
business. The above theories and models, which are 
really the main ones, partially explain our findings, 





SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to test the hypothe­
sis that the cost of equity capital and hence the total 
risk of U.S. multinational firms would decrease in 
relation to that of U.S. domestic firms because of the 
maturing (sophistication) of both the host countries 
and the multinational corporations as well as the 
improvement of communications.
Before carrying out the test, a study of host 
countries, recipient of United States foreign direct 
investment, was made. It showed that during the period 
under study, most of these countries had adopted a more 
mature and sophisticated attitude vis-à-vis the multi­
national firms. They specified the type of foreign 
direct investment they sought more clearly and made 
the rules more specific and clear. Likewise, the mul­
tinational firms became more mature, experienced and 
sophisticated in their relationships with host coun­
tries. Moreover, communications showed major improve­
ments during the period. Thus, we concluded that con­
ditions became more favourable dliriing the seventies as 
opposed to the sixties.
The results of our empirical test were generally 
supportive of our hypothesis. We found that the costs 
of equity capital and the earnings-price ratios for the 
overall averages of U.S. multinational firms decreased
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in relation to those of U.S. domestic firms during 1965 
-1978. This means that the total risk of the multina­
tional firms decreased in relation to that of the
domestic firms. Systematic risk, as measured by beta 
values, was roughly the same for both during 1971-
1973. After that, the beta average of the domestic
firms decreased in relation to that of the multination­
als because of the synchronism of economic cycles in 
major Western industrialized countries.
Making use of our results we compared the effects 
of forward-looking growth rates on the cost of equity 
capital with those of historical growth rates. In our 
case, we found that a difference in the method of cal­
culating a growth rate had a greater influence on the 
cost of equity capital than a difference of samples 
did. This was an extension of our basic findings.
Finally, we explained the development of the field 
of international business and its main theories. We 
found that, in general, they help to explain our find­
ings, though only partially. Likewise, our findings 
gave only some partial support to these theories. The 
implication is that the field of international business 
needs new theories which are more comprehensive and 
complete. Again, this was an extension of our study.
SUGGESTIONS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
The cost of equity capital and other measures of 
risk for each industry group could be the subject of a 
major research effort which would take into account the
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influence of events which specifically affected that 
industry. However, due to the lack of published mate­
rial, such a study would necessitate field studies, 
interviews and questionnaire surveys. Both the inves­
tors and the persons working in that industry group
should be contacted. Naturally, because of the confi­
dentiality of some of the required information, the 
reticence of at least a part of the interviewees would 
certainly be a limitation.
In this study, we tried to show the influence of 
some of the major economic events on the cost of equity 
capital and other risk measures pertaining to our sam­
ple. However, a far more comprehensive multiple 
regression model with a large number of variables might, 
give more precise results. A well-known example of 
such a comprehensive study is that of Lawrence Klein
and his research team at the University of
Pennsylvania. Using hundreds of variables, they use a 
multiple regression model which makes forecasts of the 
U.S. economy. Obviously, such a study for multination­
al corporations would also require large resources.
IMPLICATIONS
The results of this study are of importance for 
investors, corporate managers and host countries. A 
reduction of the cost of equity capital and the total 
risk has implications for all three. The investor will 
find that the shares of multinational firms are less
risky. The corporate managers will be in a more
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comfortable position when contemplating foreign direct 
investment and, because of the risk-return trade-off, 
will settle for lower returns on a ceteris paribus 
basis. This situation also favours the host countries 
who should normally be able to get foreign direct 
investment at a lower cost.
Our comparison of forward-looking versus histori­
cal growth rates used in calculating the cost equity 
capital showed that different methods of calculating 
such a growth rate result in substantial differences in 
the cost of equity capital. This has implications for 
financial theorists and analysts and corporate managers 
who should think carefully about the rate or rates of 
growth they are using.
Finally, our results are only partially explained 
by and, in turn, only partially support the main 
theories of international business. The implication 
for academics is that more comprehensive and complete 
new theories are needed.
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APPENDIX
MAJOR ECONOMIC EVENTS (1965-1978)
The goal of this appendix is to show what major 
economic and political events took place during the 
period under study (1965-1978). Rather than limiting 
ourselves to a strict ex post history of the period, we 
shall also look at past reports that tried to predict 
what possible developments were to take place in the 
near and distant future.
A very important factor which influences stock
prices and therefore the cost of equity capital,
earnings-price ratios and betas, is naturally 
inflation. The inflationary bout of the seventies
began with the American military intervention in
Vietnam in 1965. The inflation rate which was 1.5 
percent before that doubled to 3 percent in 1966 and 
1967, then redoubled to 6 percent in 1969 and 1970. 
Helped by a lull in economic activity and the 
imposition of direct wage and price controls, the 
inflation rate fell to the 3.5 percent level during 
1972. However, at the end of 1972, prices began to 
accelerate. In 1974, the rate of inflation had reached
12 percent (Solomon, 1975:19-20).
Before proceeding any further, it would be useful 
to explain in some detail the relationship between 
inflation and share prices up to the mid-sixties and 
after that.
Prom 1949 to the end of 1968, a period of 
relatively steady inflation, the Standard and Poor's
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Index of 500 common stock prices (S & P 500) increased 
7-fold, from 15.2 to 106.5. If we adjust for inflation 
the real increase was 4.5 times. The false conclusion 
that people reached in general was that common stock 
prices would continue to rise, providing for investors 
a continuous hedge against whatever inflation might 
occur. A corollary of this false argument was that 
there was a shortage of good stocks relative to the 
rising demands for stocks. Between 1949 and 1968, 
common stock held by pension funds and other institu­
tional investors increased from 13 billion dollars to 
220 billion dollars. Even when one looks solely at the 
real increase, it is still a formidable one. This 
created the myth that inflation was "good" for stock 
prices and that the continuous pressure of institu­
tional buying would keep stock prices rising were 
seriously doubted at the end of 1965 when the present 
inflationary round began. They were totally discarded 
due to the course of events that began at the end of 
1968. The S & P 500 stock price index, which averaged
106.5 during December 1968, averaged 69.4 during 
October 1974. If we adjust for inflation, the price of 
stocks had fallen by almost 50 percent. Since the end 
of 1968, inflation has clearly been "bad" for stock 
prices. Stocks have provided a poorer hedge against 
inflation than almost any other kind of investment. 
Moreover, the continuing purchases of stocks by insti­
tutional investors did not help the stock prices at all 
(Solomon, 1975:107-110).
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The reason behind those changes could be that 
those people who invest in bonds may have a different 
expectation than those who buy stocks, the latter
being mainly managers of pension funds and other insti­
tutions. Unlike the bond buyers who expect a high 
inflation rate to continue, stock buyers believe that 
the inflationary period is bound to end.
Sharpe (1978:173) and Lintner (1975) also reach 
the conclusion that U.S. common stock prices have gene­
rally failed the thesis that stocks are adequate hedges 
against price-level changes on a month to month or even 
year to year basis. Both nominal and real returns were 
negatively related to the rate of inflation, both
expected and actual, when relatively short holding 
periods were compared.
Another point which is very important in analy­
zing the systematic risk or beta is whether or not the 
business cycle in the United States acted in unison 
with those in Europe or the rest of the world. In the 
latest recession which began in October 1973, the level 
of activity in most of the major free world economies, 
where most of the American foreign direct investment is 
located, moved down together with the U.S. economy 
under the common pressure of a sharp cutback in 
petroleum supplies and the very large increase in
petroleum prices (Solomon, 1975:81). This, of course, 
greatly reduced or totally eliminated the beneficial 
effects of international diversification. Thus, the
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betas of multinational firms should have increased in 
relation to those of domestic firms and they did.
During the 1960-1970 decade, 1964 was a year which 
could definitely be considered a good one. The Dow 
Jones Industrial Average was at 874. 13 at the end of
1964, up 111.18 points compared to a year before.* A 
seat sold for $230,000, the highest since 1933 and 
volume had been 1,236,600 shares, a record. At the end 
of 1964, the economy was in a good condition, having 
achieved a balance between growth and inflation. On 
the political side, there was a lull in the Cold War 
and Johnson became the president with a wide margin of 
votes, thus having a strong mandate. The American 
intervention in Vietnam had not reached the large scale 
it was to reach later in 1965. So, at the beginning of
1965, the economy looked buoyant (Sobel, 
1975:288-289). Despite a slight decline in the stock 
prices in June, the euphoria continued until the end of 
the year when there was a massive American intervention 
in Vietnam. After that, while inflation began to 
accelerate, stock prices began to fall. As we 
expressed it before, this was not in line with what had 
happened during former inflationary periods. The 
decline in stock prices reached its nadir in October
1966, after which they began to rise again (Economic 
Indicators, 1969:34). During the year, mounting
* The reader may examine the Dow Jones averages for 
1965-1977 in Figure 6-1, at the end of this chapter.
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defence expenditures and an upward revision of business 
investment expenditures, together with the multiplier 
effects of large investments made before, were putting 
increasing pressures on capacity and prices 
(EIU-QER-USA*, 1966a). The New York Stock Exchange
reacted strongly to news of the production cut in cars 
between April and June leading to a rapid fall in stock 
prices (EIU-QER-USA, 1966b).
The economy's expansion slowed down again towards 
the end of 1966. The main reason for that was a large 
backlog of unsold inventory. Moreover, the capital 
budgets of the business sector suffered a sharp 
reduction while consumption slackened. Only government 
spending was on the upsurge (EIU-QER-USA, 1967a). The 
slower growth removed the immediate threat of 
inflation. Still, upward wage demands could change 
that picture. The monetary authorities were pursuing a 
more expansionary policy and interest rates were coming 
down (EIU-QER-USA, 1967a). The inventory surplus 
problem persisted in the first quarter of 1967 and the 
GNP did not increase in real terms. On the other hand, 
a recession was not likely and an acceleration of final 
sales was expected towards the end of the year. 
Business fixed investment kept increasing (EIU-QER-USA, 
1967b). At the end of 1967, the economy did pick up 
again after an inventory rundown. However, the war in 
Vietnam, continued social discontent, inflation and
* The Economist Intelligence Unit Quartely Economic 
Review: U.S.A. is abbreviated as EIU-QER-USA.
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uncertainty about the economy's future were sources of 
worry for the public and the investors (EIU-QER-USA, 
1968).
The end of 1968 and the beginning of 1969 showed a 
slower expansion of the American economy. Inflation 
being the major problem, the Nixon administration was 
trying to resolve the dilemma of fighting against 
inflation without pushing the economy into a recession 
(EIU-QER-USA, 1969a).
In October 1968, there was a general feeling that 
the war in Vietnam might slow down. Even though there 
was no peace, prices and volume rose at the NYSE. The 
Dow Jones Industrial Average was above the 950 mark 
after increasing by more than 100 points since 
February. After the election of Richard Nixon as 
president, the market peaked at 985.21 on December 3 
after which prices began to fall until the middle of 
1970 (Sobel, 1975:320-321). A major reason for this 
was the administration's tight money policy that tried 
to stem inflation. The discount rate which had been 
4 percent in October, 1967, was 5.5 percent in early 
1969 and went to 6 percent in April, a mark not seen 
since 1929 (Sobel, 1975:320-321).
The economic and political uncertainties made the 
small investors nervous and excited while the 
institutions (insurance and investment companies, 
pension funds, nonprofit institution, common trust 
funds, mutual savings banks, etc.) became wary (Sobel,
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1975:320-321). In any case, investors were expecting a 
mild and short recession for the latter part of 1969 
and the beginning of 1970 (EIU-QER-USA, 1969b). 
Actually, during the first quarter of 1970, the 
after-tax profits of manufaturing corporations were 
down 13 percent corresponding to the same period of the 
previous year. This was the main reason that led the 
Dow Jones below the 700 mark (EIU-QER-USA, 1970a). The 
high technology issues were the hardest hit. On May 
26, the Dow Jones fell by 10.20 points and closed at
631.6 points, which was even below where it had been 
when Kennedy was inaugurated seven years earlier. 
Sobel thinks that it could have been worse had it not 
been for a generation of investors who had never known 
real panic before. They had become used to the idea 
that protection was at hand from the government and so 
did not give the matter serious consideration (Sobel, 
1975:324). Unlike the quasi paranoid investors of the 
late 1920s and the 1930s, they had a high confidence in 
government and business institutions (Sobel, 
1975:324). Thus it came as no surprise to see the 
stocks stabilizing in June and then rallying in July 
1970. On August 28, the Dow Jones closed at 765.81 
after rising more than 130 points in three months. 
According to Sobel (1975:325), "It was an 'on-off 
market' with investors' moods switching from extreme 
bullishness to gloomy bearishness suddenly without 
stopping in between, and in each case ignoring contrary
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evidence on the other side". During this second half 
of 1970 when stock prices recovered, wholesale prices 
slowed down for a while. The government was expected 
to produce a deficit budget for 1971-72. Money became 
easier and interest rates had fallen. The Dow Jones 
exceeded 800 in December and Wall Street was optimistic 
( EIU-QER— USA, 1970b). In the end, it was calculated 
that GNP had fallen by 0.4 percent in 1970
(EIU-QER-USA, 1971a).
Inflationary forces remained strong at the 
beginning of 1971. The government acted to moderate 
steel prices, making a strike very probable
(EIU-QER-USA, 1971a). GNP rose at an annual rate of 
7.1 percent in the first quarter of 1971. This was a
marked improvement over 1970. Industrial production
and inventories were growing only slowly. The growth
was led by non-durables (mainly food-products). The 
general feeling was that the battle against inflation 
was to be a long one. While the money supply was
rising fast, corporate profits were recovering 
(EIU-QER-USA, 1971b). On August 15, 1971, the
president announced crisis measures against 
persistently high unemployment and inflation. A 90-day 
wage and price freeze, an investment tax credit, the 
abolition of the excise duty on cars, acceleration of 
income tax concessions and a number of expenditure cuts 
and a suspension of the dollar's convertibility to 
gold. There was also to be a 10 percent surcharge on
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most imports and a 10 percent cut in foreign aid. GNP 
grew at an annualized rate of 4.8 percent in real terms 
during the second quarter of 1971 (EIU-QER-USA, 
1971c). GNP growth slowed to 3.9 percent in the third 
quarter during which the inflationary trend slowed 
down. The stock market recovered (EIU-QER-USA,
197 Id). Real growth for the whole of 1971 was 2.7 
percent after a revision of figures (EIU-QER-USA, 
1972a).
Stock prices rose to a high level in the summer of
1972. The Dow Jones which had fallen to 889.15 on 
January 26, rose to close at 973.51 on August 14 before 
the pre-Election Day which should normally have been 
full of uncertainty. In 1972, however, in spite of his 
anti-business views, the presidential candidate George 
McGovern had little prospects of winning the elec­
tions. If McGovern were to be elected, it was 
generally believed that stock prices would fall sharp­
ly. But since the prospects of his electoral victory 
were extremely slim, the investors were not affected. 
In any case, when the other candidate, Richard Nixon, 
won a landslide victory, prices rose and exceeded the 
1000 mark to reach 1,036.27 on December 11 before 
settling down towards the end of the month. Then, when 
the Vietnam War ended, stock prices rose pushing the 
Dow Jones to a peak of 1051.70 on January 11, 1973
(Sobel, 1975:362). A November 1972 survey put business 
plant and equipment expenditure 9 percent up in
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1972, and forecasted a further large increase for the 
first half of 1973, especially in manufacturing. The 
annualized increase in prices was 3.8 percent a year 
for the three months from September to November 1972 
with food prices pushing up the rate (EIU-QER-USA, 
1972b). Although the administration had pledged to 
keep inflation under control, the cost of living was 
still increasing rapidly. Interest rates were also 
increasing but they did not seem to have an influence 
on prices as yet (Sobel, 1975:363).
Then, in 1973, there was the famous Watergate 
scandal.
As this event and the trials dominated the 
newspaper headlines, public confidence in the President 
declined rapidly. In addition to substantial
inflation, high interest rates and the President's 
impeachment because of the Watergate affair, meat 
shortages arose in the summer while there was a fuel 
shortage in the fall of the same year 1973 (Sobel, 
1975:363). Meat shortages were due to the price 
freezes which aimed to cut the rate of inflation while 
the fuel shortage was because of the Arab oil boycott 
which in turn arose of the United States massive 
military help to Israel during its October 1973 War 
against Syria and Egypt.
By the end of 1973, "serious and sober" people 
began to wonder whether the world was not on the edge
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of another recession which would dwarf that of
1929-1933. Corporate profits were excellent in 1972
and 1973 but, in the end, several of the speculative
shares lost value and that added further worries about
the general state of the economy. (Sobel, 1975:363).
Sobel explains it as follows:
The illegal involvement of some businesses 
and businessmen in the Nixon campaign,
combined with the windfall profits of major 
petroleum campanies after the Arab Oil
boycott, added to the general woes caused by 
inflation and high interest rates. The
economic and political agonies the nation 
underwent in 1973 and early 1974 were
scarcely less traumatic than those suffered 
during the Vietnam War. Then came the
impeachment debates followed by Nixon's 
resignation and the uncertain early days of 
President Ford... The Economy began to
decline in the second half of 1974, as
antiinflationary programs had their impact.
By early 1975, it was evident that the nation 
had entered its worst recession since the 
1930s and the future appeared bleak. (Sobel, 
1975:363).
All these events and feelings found their 
reflections on stock prices. The Dow Jones fell in 
1973 and then prices collapsed in 1974. Unlike 1929 
which had witnessed a sudden crash, 1974 consisted of a 
series of sharp declines followed by weak recoveries. 
The Dow Jones was 851.90 on August 22, 1973. It rose 
to 987.06 by October 26 and then fell to 788.31 on 
December 12, 1973 (Sobel, 1975:363-364). All these
movements shattered the confidence of investors who 
began to desert the stock market. Many started to 
speculate in gold or bought commercial papers. Also 
because of rising inflation, people had to spend more
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and thus to save less since, in general, wages did not 
keep up with inflation.
Unlike the great depression of 1929-1933, 1974 was 
a year of stagflation, i.e., inflation and stagnation 
were going together. Moreover, all stocks did not fall 
equally. A large group of well-established growth 
issues like Xerox, Polaroid, American Telephone and 
Telegraph, Pfizer, Kresge, etc. were bought by gigantic 
funds and other institutional investors. The latter 
not only dinged to the shares of these companies but 
also supported their prices by buying them whenever 
they began to fall. This situation, which kept the 
stock prices of certain companies high in relation to 
others, was called the "Two-Tier Market". Naturally, 
this artificial phenomenon could not have gone on 
forever and the collapse came in late 1973 and 
continued in 1974. The mutual funds, which owned 
large bulks of these issues, declined drastically. For 
instance, Morgan Guaranty controlled over two billion 
dollars of IBM alone (Sobel, 1975:364-365). The 
massive losses incurred by funds led individual 
investors to sell their shares. This led to a further 
decline in prices. Finally, fearing both a continued 
decline in stock prices and widespread redemptions, 
many of the mutual funds withdrew from the stockmarket 
and put their money in commercial paper and treasury 
notes (Sobel, 1975:366). This further depressed stock 
prices. At one point in 1974, there was a hope that
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institutional investors would come back to buy stocks 
again but this did not materialize (Sobel, 1975:366). 
Instead, prices fell and rose with spurts and the 
general trend was dipping sharply downward.
It was later calculated that real GNP growth was 5.9 
percent in 1973 (EIU-QER-USA, 1974a). It could have 
been higher had it not been for the oil shortages and 
the consequent decline in the car industry. Over the 
last quarter of 1973, consumer spending declined by an 
annual rate of 2.4 percent (EIU-QER-USA, 1974a).
At the beginning of 1974, wage and price controls 
were expected to end in all industries but health and 
petroleum products by April 30. As controls were 
lifted, consumer prices were jolting upward. Wholesale 
prices showed a one month jump of 7.7 percent in 
February. Farm product prices went up by 11.7 percent 
during the first quarter of 1974 (EIU-QER-USA, 1974a).
During the same period, GNP declined by 6.3 
percent as personal consumption expenditure, the prime 
component of GNP, declined for the second quarter in a 
row (EIU-QER-USA, 1974b). Real personal spending 
diminished by 2.8 percent in the first quarter while 
spending on services continued to expand. Dividend 
growth decelerated substantially and real disposable 
incomes were declining by over 6 percent at an annual 
rate. Retail sales growth was hampered by poor car 
sales but there were expectations for improvements. 
The Federal Reserve was continuing its tight monetary 
policy to prevent inflation (EIU-QER-USA, 1974b).
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Real GNP declined by 1.2 percent in the second 
quarter of 1974 but real personal consumption was 
rising a little. The rapid expansion in growth of new 
orders made a gain in real industrial output by the 
year-end a possibility (EIU-QER-USA, 1974c). Consumer 
spending on durable goods, particularly new car sales, 
pushed up real spending despite the poor showing for 
non-durables and services. A high level of capital 
expenditures was still forecast for the end of 1974 
(EIU-QER-USA, 1974c).
Real GNP fell by 2.1 percent in the third quarter 
of 1974. Retail sales fell since September even by 
current prices, led by a decrease in automobile sales. 
Business expectations for 1975 suggested a drop of 3-4 
percent in real investments (EIU-QER-USA, 1974d).
The GNP increased by 3.3 percent annually at 
current prices during the fourth quarter of 1974 but at 
constant prices it was an annual decline of 9.1. GNP in 
1974 was 2.2 percent lower than in 1973 in real terms 
(EIU-QER-USA, 1975a). Industrial production decreased 
by 3.6 percent in January and 8.9 percent in the three 
months since October 1974. New orders of durable goods 
slumped in December 1974 and continued to fall in 
January 1975 (EIU-QER-USA, 1975a).
There was an 11.3 percent real decrease in the GNP 
during the first quarter of 1975. Industrial
production was 12.4 percent lower in April compared to 
the same period of the previous year (EIU-QER-USA, 
1975b).
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The outlook for cars, business equipment and steel 
was gloomy. Consumer prices in April 1975 were 10.2 
percent up compared with the previous year. Pre-tax 
profits fell by 24 percent between the last quarter of 
1974 and the first of 1975 but the stock market 
continued recovering and it was expected that the GNP 
growth rate could reach 7 percent by the first quarter 
of 1976 (EIU-QER-USA, 1975b).
The real GNP growth for the third quarter of 1975 
was a 13.2 percent annual rate. The rise in industrial 
production was flattening out after a notable rebound 
in consumer durables. It was the spending on cars 
which brought about the fast GNP growth in the third 
quarter (EIU-QER-USA, 1975c).
The GNP real growth rate fell back to 4.9 percent 
in the fourth quarter of 1975. Industrial production 
grew at an annual rate of 8.8 percent in the three 
months to February. Although inventory to sales ratios 
were falling, depressed business capital spending was 
unlikely to recover much in 1976. The recovery of 
profits and share prices continued up to February 
(EIU-QER-USA, 1976a).
In spite of a smaller increase in final sales, a 
shift to inventory accumulation brought about a fast 
real annual GNP growth rate of 8.5 (later revised at 
9.2) percent in the first quarter of 1976. The two 
most important items leading to a rapid increase in 
consumer spending were food and cars. Due to more
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expensive oil and food prices, consumer prices rose by 
0.6 percent in May 1976 (EIU-QER-USA, 1976b).
In the second quarter of 1976, real GNP grew at an 
annual rate of 4.4 percent. Accumulated inventory 
decreased due to increased final sales. Inflation 
seemed to be rising (EIU-QER-USA, 1976c).
If Jimmy Carter, the new president, were to 
provide some stimulus to the economy on taking office, 
GNP was expected to grow by about 5 percent in, real 
terms between 1976 and 1977 (EIU-QER-USA, 1976d). Real 
GNP growth was an annual 3.8 percent in the third 
quarter of 1976. Industrial production declined during 
the months of September and October due to low retail 
sales and an involuntary build-up in inventories which 
led to reduced ordering rates (EIU-QER-USA, 1976d).
During the first quarter of 1977, Wall Street was 
more pessimistic than President Carter about inflation 
as it feared that price controls or tighter monetary 
policy might follow. However, it was also thought that 
the rise in the inflation rate and interest rates could 
be sufficiently moderate so as to allow the upward 
trend to continue early in 1978 (EIU-QER-USA, 1977a). 
For 1977, prospects seemed to be more solid. After the 
poor first quarter growth affected by bad weather, a 
high 9.5 percent annual growth was expected in the 
second quarter. An inventory build-up would help 
this. Except for fuel products, industrial production 
fell in January almost across the board but recovered
— 262 —
in February when orders for capital goods were still 
lagging but were expected to pick up in the wake of 
large orders for consumer durable products 
(EIU-QER-USA, 1977a).
GNP was expected to rise by 5.3 percent in 1977 
despite decreasing consumer expenditures resulting from 
higher savings and taxes. This growth was expected to 
slow down in the second half of the year with housing 
and business capital as strong features (EIU-QER-USA, 
1977b). The first quarter GNP growth rate went up to 
6.9 percent thanks to a recovery in stockbuilding. New 
orders for goods looked healthy. During the first five 
months, retail prices increased by 9.5 percent but 
were expected to slow down (EIU-QER-USA, 1977b).
Slower growth rather than recession was the 
expectation for 1978. Government spending, especially 
by the states and local governments, was to be an 
expansionary factor - GNP was expected to rise by 5 
percent for 1977 and just under 5 percent for the first 
half of 1978. Wholesale prices fell because of lower 
farm prices while the rate of retail price inflation 
moderated (EIU-QER-USA, 1977c).
The real GNP growth rate of the fourth quarter in 
1977 was not expected to exceed 4.9 percent despite the 
buoyancy of the economy. This was due to reduced 
stockholding. Investments were expected to increase 
once policy uncertainties were eliminated. A real GNP 
growth rate of 4.6 percent was forecast for 1978. 
Wholesale prices began to increase faster even though
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retail prices were still not affected by October 1977 
(EIU-QER-USA, 1977d).
An unusually hard winter in the early months of 
1978 depressed economic activity especially the 
construction and retail sectors. However, considerable 
improvement was expected in the second and third
quarters of 1978 when there would be a high level of
activity to make up for the time lost during the first 
quarter. Industrial production slowed down partly 
because of the previous high build up of inventories 
held by retailers. The influence of rising wholesale 
prices were also felt in consumer prices which also
rose during the first quarter of 1978 (EIU-QER-USA,
1978a).
Bad weather, the coal strike and a weakening 
underlying trend reduced real GNP growth to zero in the 
first quarter of 1978. However, industrial production 
came back strongly in the March-May period led by 
business equipment (EIU-QER-=USA, 1978b). There was a 
surge in retail sales in March and April, but they 
dropped back in May. Increased savings and worse
inflation caused a fall in consumer spending 
(EIU-QER-USA, 1978b).
In the above explanations of major economic 
events, the relations of some of the events to the 
results of our test have been indicated. Some more 
explanations have already been given ; within three 
chapters which deal with the results and the comparison
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of forward-looking and historical growth rates. 
However, it would be appropriate to explain the 
phenomenon of stagflation and virtually synchronized 
economic cycles in major industrialized countries after
1973. This should be of essential importance when 
explaining the results of the betas.
Unlike the inflationary periods during the forties 
and fifties, inflation in the seventies has affected 
the quasi-totality of the industrialized countries. 
Consequently, multinational corporations have had less 
possibilities of fighting against inflation by shifting 
investments or purchases from one set of countries to 
another. During previous inflationary bouts, many 
multinational firms had sought to keep their costs at a 
steady level by buying their raw materials or component 
parts from countries which had a lower rate of 
inflation and/or lower prices. Thus, by increasing 
their purchases of Japanese steel, American and 
European firms had attempted to reduce their costs by 
finding competitive suppliers.
Moreover, during the entire post-war period, the 
business cycles of the major industrialized countries 
did not coincide with one another. This was a very 
important factor since it was beneficial for the 
international diversification of the multinational 
firms by reducing their systematic risks (betas). For 
instance, when industries were working at almost full 
capacity, thus resulting in higher prices in the United
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States, it was possible to find other industrialized 
countries with industries working at only partial capa­
city. This meant that the latter countries would sell 
their products at lower prices. Consequently American 
firms were able to get supplies at lower costs from 
other countries or from their subsidiaries. Obviously, 
this situation gave the U.S. multinational corporations 
a relative edge over the U.S. domestic firms. The for­
mer had wider possibilities of diversification and 
could reduce their global risk and stabilize their 
profits.
During the early seventies, first, the demand of 
industrial products and then of raw materials increased 
in all industrialized countries and was often accom­
panied by factories working at full productive capacity 
(Hackett, 1975). Price increases were rapidly felt. 
In numerous cases, the increase in the prices of raw 
materials during 1972 and 1973 alone exceeded those 
observed during the entire decade of the sixties. 
Thus, the possibilities of escaping the negative 
aspects of inflation by diversifying sources of sup­
plies became a virtual impossibility for multinational 
firms. Beginning from 1973, the general demand dimi­
nished substantially despite a persisting inflation. 
Firms had to face the combined effect ‘of cost increases 
and reduced demand. This situation which spread to all 
the industrialized Western countries diminished the 
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